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Abstract The chapter argues for a lecture of the notion of development as strongly
linked to the uneven distribution of material and non-material sources of power
among groups. It thus analyses the rise of a public environmentalist awareness in
the late twentieth century as a challenge to the capitalist pattern of production and
consumption. Finally, the chapter aims to shed some light on the process of
mainstreaming these claims by subsuming them within the western model of
societal transformation, under the new, catchy label of sustainable development.
Pressing for institutional solutions to environmental depletion has meant to
further spread the sustainability goal worldwide. On the other hand, it has also
implied a kind of betrayal of the truly transformative instances of many social
movements and local communities, which were seeking for a revolutionary, rather
than reformative, path to societal change.
4.1 Introduction
This chapters deals with the history of sustainable development by going back to
the very notion of development.
As development has mostly been dealt with through international lenses, in spite
of the particular local issues raised by processes of societal change, the international
structure stands back as a framework able to co-explain the main processes which
will be discussed. Once we are aware of the profound power and geopolitical
inequalities among states and – more correctly – social groups worldwide, this
framework in turn proves to lead to a critical understanding of the rise of the
development notion, as well as of its continuous reviews and improvements.
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Beginning from point four of the inaugural address by President Truman, the
first section critically addresses the so-called developmentalist era. Since then there
have been many culturally specific interpretations of social change and transforma-
tion. However, our deep conviction is that, at the apogee of American and – broader
speaking – western pre-eminence, the scientific and cultural mainstream was
scarcely pluralist. Rather, developmentalism modernization-style tended to over-
look the history of colonial exploitation of most of the countries invited to replicate
the western road to well-being. This storyline, in other words, took for granted a
level playing field, thus missing the relational point and looking at any single unit in
the 1950s as if it started from the same departing point as western countries in the
nineteenth century.
Since the 1960s, however, and thanks to the ideological opposition between the
first and the second world, third world countries have expressed their unavailability
to be absorbed into one of the two geopolitical blocs. The rise of the non-alignment
movement coincided with the rise of, and was in turn analytically fuelled by, lines of
thought such as the dependency school. Against the modernization school – whose
main points are mentioned in the first section – many Latin-American scholars have
queried the atomistic understanding of development, outlining themutual relationship
between development and underdevelopment and coming to propose a delinking
strategy for less wealthy countries. To be sure, dependency as well as other counter-
theories had its own internal fallacies. However, it concurred to stimulate debates and
initiatives focused on a fairer economic structure on international grounds.
Criticisms also paved the way for a new attention to non-material dimensions
such as the cultural one. That cultural turn represented a first, highly valuable
breach into the economicist wall of many developmentalist accounts. However,
accounting for cultural particularisms has too often meant keeping the binary
opposition between modern and backward societies, under the label of modern
and backward cultures – with the inevitable and implicit assumption of the superi-
ority of the formers which were, not by chance, the devisors of these asymmetric
and mutually exclusive counter-concepts. Cultural intervening variables’ misuse
has thus led to the attempt to universalise a particular culture, exactly the western
one, as the most appropriate to the goal of economic growth.
As all these competing scientific trends were built, the international hierarchy of
power has experienced its own changes, the most dramatic one being the fall of the
socialist bloc. Thus, after a couple of decades of unquestioned unipolarism, the
most common description of the current distribution of power among nations is
multipolarism. As shown by Sect. 4.3, economic figures confirm the rise of new
economic giants on the international scene. However, outlining the new role of
national powers such as China or India – and thus speculating on a new national
leadership according to a strict hegemonic reasoning – does not seem enough if we
are interested in picking out the new cultural and scientific trends underpinning the
current structure of global governance.
Emphasising the soft sources of international power requires paying attention to
the ideational grip of a set of ideas, beliefs, institutions and so on and their ability to
not only gain the general consensus, but stimulate emulation. In spite of the
longstanding appeal of many dimensions of American scientific and popular
164 J. Napolitano
culture, the main promoters of the new ideational trends are far from representing a
single nation’s worldview. Accordingly, taking for granted the weight of political
collective actors belonging to government levels different from the national one,
one of the core goals of the chapter is to underline the influential role of a broader
group of actors. Epistemic communities, entrepreneurs, media, lobbyists, civil
servants and executives from multilateral organisations, activists from social
movements, volunteers and practitioners from NGOs: they all participate in the
process of shaping the changing rules of the game thanks to a faster scientific and
lay knowledge production and dissemination. When their grip on processes of
submission and selection of social problems, agenda building, decision-making,
policy implementation and evaluation has a worldwide outcome – eventually in
spite of the local feature of the issues addressed – we can talk about them as
transnational elites.
With respect to the development discourse, the role of these elites over the last
decades has been twofold. First of all, they have been able to save developmentalism
from the impasse it precipitated because of the many theoretical criticisms and
empirical failures (exemplified by the lost decade of development), by adjusting it
consistently with sensitivities such as the environmental one. On the other hand, they
have contributed to mitigating the most drastic demands expressed by niches,
incorporating the topic of environmentalism without taking seriously into account
the problems connected to the very topic of development.
This is where sustainable development comes from. It was born thanks to the
popularisation of instances and claims originally disregarded by agencies and
institutions in the development sector during the apogee of western cultural and
scientific power. Actually, environmentalism could be looked at as a part of the
broader anti-systemic movement, aiming at a radical change of the capitalist
lifestyle. Then, it has been legitimised and, as usual, the institutionalisation of
conflict has led to a noticeable reduction of its revolutionary contents. Sustainable
development, as pursued by most of the institutions in charge of global governance,
represents today a reformist strategy, in spite of a long-standing, radical view of it
diffused especially at the base.
This is why, among the most genuine sustainable development promoters, its
development element, with its intrinsic reference to economic growth, still
represents the tricky ingredient of the recipe. The new wine appears to have a
good potential for being a very good one, provided that we are wise enough to throw
away the old bottle.
4.2 Setting the Development Goal
Since the nineteenth century, a divide was established between natural sciences and
the humanities, especially within the English educational and research system, as
synthesised by the title of Snow’s 1959 lecture, the two cultures (Snow 1990).
Between those two poles, a third autonomous field of research, social sciences, had
emerged by the middle of the twentieth century. According to Weber, social
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sciences represent a kind of via media between the search for general laws of
nomothetic sciences on the one hand, and the idiographic accounts of humanities,
on the other. In the aftermath of the Second World War, within social sciences
themselves, the line between sociology (tackling the issues of how people live and
relate to each other), economics (focusing on wealth production and distribution),
and politics (the art of governing the res publica), has been further fixed. Mean-
while, new fields of research had been institutionalised: anthropology, furnishing
usable knowledge on ‘others’ traditions once the decolonisation had been launched;
and psychology, addressing individual behaviour, emotions, shocks and so on.
Thus, different bodies of knowledge have tackled their own issues, mainly
relying either on the nation-state or the individual agent as their basic units of
analysis. ‘The division of labor among the social sciences has been a practical
necessity, but it has had the unfortunate side effect of overspecialization’ (Hofstede
1995: 213). For instance, typical anthropological concerns such as cultural diversity
were paid scarce attention by non-anthropologists during the post-war period.
The developmentalist discourse has risen exactly in the framework of that
general scientific environment (McCarthy 2007). Since the 1950s, the goal of
development became institutionalised on international grounds, put forward by
the United States as a kind of promise of improved living-conditions (So 1990;
Rist 1996; Di Meglio 1997; McMichael 2004).
Before that era, development – as well as the broader issues of change, transfor-
mation and transition – had been a controversial analytical dimension for the social
sciences, be it for the feared, often unspoken link with societal and political
revolutions, be it for the trend to rely on static analytical categories. Thenceforth,
however, development has been understood as a desirable, cumulative and linear
process that every country was supposed to experience in order to replicate the
western path of economic growth grounded on English industrialisation and then on
the mass production and consumption goal reached by the United States. In fact,
Few realize that Americans in 1776 had the same income level as the average African
today. Yet, like all the present-day developed nations, the United States was lucky enough
to escape poverty before there were Developmentalists. [. . .] George Washington did not
have to deal with aid partners, getting structurally adjusted by them, or preparing poverty-
reductions strategy papers for them. (Easterly 2007: 35)
To be sure, the idea of a one-style-fits-all model for the enhancement of living
conditions had been envisaged in the western political, social and economic agenda
well before the 1949 inaugural address by President Truman. However, ‘it is only
from that moment on that development policy became a truly global endeavor in
which the world was divided into two groups of countries or regions, the developed
and the underdeveloped’ (Lepenies 2008: 205), with the formers devoted to provide
the latters with development assistance.
Once that the pre-modern constrains preventing the full deployment of the
economic and political revolutionary processes – respectively led by the UK and
France (Touraine 1994) and epitomised by the rise of a working class employed in
the industrial sector and of national democracies led by elected officials – were
overcome, the goal of western countries had become the accomplishment of
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economic growth, and then the building of representative democracies. Truman’s
speech, and especially its point IV, has thus only contributed to the universalisation
of such aspirations on a world-wide scale, launching the development era and
introducing the notion of underdevelopment and the unit of measurement of Gross
National Product (Rist 1996). In spite of the fact that ‘one can expect definitions of
the quality of life concept to be culturally dependent’ (Hofstede 1984: 389), the
recipe for national development was tailored on the western path of economic,
political and social change, and on western peoples’ experiences and desires in
terms of labour market structure, gender and family roles, religious beliefs and so
on. Drawing upon older analytical oppositions such as those proposed by Maine,
T€onnies, and Durkheim, the gap between modernity and backwardness became the
catching all dichotomy of the post war political, scientific and economic jargons.
4.2.1 Western Social Sciences and Third World’s Claims
During the Cold War, approximately two million people, many barely freed by the
colonial subjugation, discovered their status of underdeveloped or, in the best case,
developing countries: countries and peoples, namely, to-be-developed. Against the
western and Socialist1 worlds, the collective label for the to-be-developed peoples
was Third World.2 Developmentalism found a warm welcome in those target
countries, which enabled the US to pursue its liberal order on an international
basis. In fact,
Rather than involving whole nations, this acceptance came from small indigenous groups
who had been educated in Europe or had in some other ways come into contact with
European ideas. (Tenbruck 1994: 199)
1 The Soviet Union also tried to offer a socialist version of the formula towards the moral and
material progress of backward societies, pointing, alike the US, to gain the loyalty of peoples and
countries against the antagonist geopolitical bloc, consistently with the bipolar geopolitical frame
(So 1990; Di Meglio 1997; McMichael 2004). However, according to some strands of literature,
those two narratives shared many prescriptions for the developmental nation-state – first of all,
industrialization – and aimed at the same goal: bridging the standard of living divide between rich
and poor. For instance: ‘the particular recommendations of the United States and the Soviet Union
were not substantially different: strengthen the urban sector, expand education, engage in judicious
protectionism, mechanize production, and coping the pattern of the leading state’ (Wallerstein
2007: 56). That regimes as different as western liberal democracies and socialist states came up
with a quite similar understanding of development, in spite of the competing visions of social,
political and economic organizations they displayed, is hardly surprising. Indeed, at least since the
eighteenth century, scholars as different in their own political and ideological persuasions such as
‘Comte, Hegel, Marx, Spencer and others [had] described the inexorable, irreversible, stage by
stage and unstoppable advance of humankind through successive stages towards a golden age on
Earth’ (Du Pisani 2006: 84).
2 In 1952, Alfred Sauvy, paraphrasing the 1789 title by Sieye`s (Qu’est-ce que le tiers-e´tat?),
introduced in an article called Trois Mondes, Une Plane`te the notion of Third World, thereafter
become quite common to indicate both less developed countries and non-aligned ones.
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Regardless, this was enough to guarantee the success of developmentalism on
the side of target countries as well.
Thereafter, the process of knowledge production and dissemination in the just
established scientific field of development studies endeavoured to flourish world-
wide, consistently with the model agreed upon by studies of the history of science,
which ‘have shown that science is a cultural, social activity permeated with values
and preferences’ (Turnhout 2010: 26). Social sciences reconciled with the ‘danger-
ous’ topic of change and commenced to understand development through a norma-
tive approach. In other words, the transformation issue gained full legitimacy within
theoretical and practical debates. Drawing upon the former idea of progress – and
legitimising it definitively after centuries of diatribes between conservatives and
progressives – development came to be known as a linear, cumulative and ameliora-
tive trajectory towards modernity, consistently with the older functionalist and
evolutionist approaches. This scientific, political and institutional view of the
so-called modernization school implied the reference to a metaphor, projecting the
main features of the development of natural organism – directionality, continuity,
cumulativeness, irreversibility – onto the social world: this analytical artifice led to
the naturalisation and universalisation of a particular history, the western one (Rist
1996).3 Consistently with an ascending vision of the history which has seldom
recognised other approaches to the temporal dimension as equally legitimate (Pomian
1979; Du Pisani 2006; Featherstone and Venn 2006; Ribeiro 2007), developing
countries were supposed to pass through a number of historical steps until the full
accomplishment of modernisation. ‘The new assumption was that, if the countries of
the South would only adopt the proper policies, they would 1 day, some time in the
future, become as technologically modern as wealthy as the countries of the North’
(Wallerstein 2005: 1264).
Of course, modernity referred to the widespread diffusion of the capitalist mode
of production and consumption. It also implied the downplaying of those unequal
power relations (Pieterse 1994) underpinning western economic path of develop-
ment both with regard to the social imbalances inside the northern states themselves
and the exploitative relationship between richer states and their peripheral colonies.
This is why, among the many criticisms the development discourse has triggered, it
has been defined as a project (McMichael 2004) or a colonial discourse (Escobar
1995). It has also been considered an ideology the same way as communism, for it
favoured the attainment of collective outcomes and presented itself as a scientific
theory framed by technicians, scientists, experts, planners and the like: ‘it shares the
3 ‘This identification of modernity with the process of modernization, this absolute confidence in
the ‘progress of the human spirit’, to quote the title of one of Condorcet’s works, and in the
necessity of destroying the old world was so total, so obvious to the majority of Westerners, that
still today, at the end of a century defined by a great diversity of modes of modernization and
resource development [. . .] the Western countries resist any analysis of their own specific mode of
modernization, so convinced of their own incarnation of universal modernity itself’ (Touraine
1994: 121).
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common ideological characteristic of suggesting there is only one correct answer,
and it tolerates little dissent’ (Easterly 2007: 31).
Thus, during the golden age of developmentalism, the modernization view
informed, first of all, the economicistic approach, epitomised by the evolutionistic
work of Walt Rostow, who equated the stage of mass consumption, following the
phases of take-off and maturity, with the final stage of the path nation-states follow
to become developed. The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Mani-
festo, was published in the early 1960s, at the very end of a more than 10-year
leadership of the MIT Center for International Studies. Rostow’s involvement in
US foreign policy is not astounding; rather, it provides us with a clearer idea of the
link between American geopolitical concerns during the Cold War and the zenith of
the developmentalist discourse. American-style modernisation had to be realised
even at the cost of an externally driven, bloody revolution (So 1990). This was the
view taken within one of the most authoritative schools of economics and interna-
tional politics of the time; a school which has traditionally been ‘more loosely
oriented to democratic values than that by sociologists of modernization or by
comparative political scientists’ (McCarthy 2007: 12).
Indeed, mirroring the disciplinary specialisation of that period, there was also a
strong research line on political modernisation. Under the aegis of the Social
Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics, and the leadership
of Gabriel Almond previously, and of Lucien Pye later, scholars such as Coleman
carried out their inquiry in the field of political development ‘pervaded by the
dominant ethos of scientificity, with its emphasis on behavioralism, value-free
inquiry, quantitative measurement, the discovery and testing of empirical laws
[. . .]. And it generally underwrote the need for strong postcolonial states to direct
the modernization process through central planning guided by scientifically trained
experts’ (ibid.: 11).
Finally, there was a stricter sociological approach to modernisation, too. Its main
research centre was the Harvard Department of Social Relations, under the leader-
ship of Talcott Parsons. Strongly relying on Darwinian naturalistic explanations and
Weberian culturalistic legacies, Harvard University scholars such as Levy and
Smelser focused on the gap between modern and backyard societies and, with
David McClelland’s works on the achieving society, were also able to propose a
psychological reading of the process of modernisation. Briefly, the general thesis
was that
The development process [postcolonial societies] had already begun under colonial regimes
could best be completing by their adopting Western attitudes, values, practices, and
institutions – including market mechanisms and state bureaucracies, industrialisation and
urbanization, secularization and rationalization, the rule of law and democratization, social
mobility and mass education, and so forth. And all this could best be accomplished with the
assistance of already developed societies and under the management of strong national
states. (ibid.: 10)
On the domestic ground, the main agencies of these developmentalist strategies
were the nation-states, the main unit of analysis in the field of social sciences. Besides
the emphasis on economic growth – to be pursued through industrialisation – the
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second universal ingredient of the development project was thus the nation-state
(McMichael 2004).4 Nation-states were developmental states, strongly involved in
the goal of economic growth – that is to say, of obtaining an increased per capita
GNP, the traditional development measure (Easterly 2007) – and, to a lesser or to a
greater extent, also concerned with citizens’ wellbeing – consistently with the apogee
of Keynesian welfare state (McCarthy 2007) and its implementation within national
frameworks differing with regard to their own specific administrative, social, economic
and religious traditions.
The geopolitical context of the golden age of development was also relatively stable:
Cold war rivalry governed much of the political geography of the development project.
(McMichael 2004: 48)
Among its main political, military and socio-economic effects, Cold War with
its corollary of the balance of power between the US and the URSS and in the more
general framework of decolonisation influenced first of all the developmentalist
discourse. Moreover, it had a dramatic impact on the international relations
between developed and developing countries as well as among the non-aligned
countries themselves.
For instance, the bipolar context both stimulated and somehow frustrated politi-
cal ventures such as the 1955 Bandung Conference hosted by President Sukarno
and joined by many Asian and African countries – against the neo-imperialism
and neo-colonialism of the two major superpowers; as well as the formal establish-
ment of the non-aligned movement led by Indonesia, India, Egypt and
Yugoslavia, and inspired by the principle of non-interference in international
affairs. Since the 1960s, ‘the Non-Aligned Movement shifted from primarily
political preoccupations, such as the liberation of the remaining colonies, towards
a focus upon economic underdevelopment as the root cause of their political
impotence’ (Worsley 1994: 85). From the economic point of view, at stake was
the economic model of development pointed out by the existing multilateral
institutional order and epitomised by the Bretton Woods system.
One of the first collective challenges against the international economic structure
underpinning developmentalism was the establishment of the Group of 77, joined
by Third World countries and attempting to obtain the reform of the international
trade especially through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. If nothing, these claims had an institutional impact on the way development
was understood by core international agencies: since the late 1960s, for instance, a
new focus on equity was introduced within the developmental discourse, as
demonstrated by the growing attention towards the matter of basic needs – a
topic whose roots were definitely non-institutional. After a strong emphasis on
economic growth as the way to improve material wellbeing, the traditionally
economicistic analyses of development institutions were widened by a new
4 ‘A discipline which emerged in the early post-World War II period, [. . .] development studies
always took for granted the context of national economies and nation-states’ (Rapley 2008: 180).
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attention to social, cultural and political dimensions. It was pursued, for instance,
through the incorporation of the Human Development Index and the Human
Freedom Index, whose establishment and diffusion owed quite a lot to the activities
of the United Nations Development Program (McCarthy 2007). Unfortunately, the
institutionalisation of the basic needs approach led to its adoption as a theoretical as
well as a practical paradigm by many international aid agencies without triggering
any serious reassessment of development projects.
A further expression of the issues collectively raised by many to-be-developed
took the form of the 1974 proposal to the United Nations for a New Economic
International Order. The initiative of the G-77 was strongly influenced by Third
World representatives struggling for a united South and stressing in particular the
aims of economic growth, the expansion of international trade and the increasing
of aid – notions, according to Rist, even too consistent with the old order
dominated by principles of capitalism and thus advantaging, at the best, national
bourgeoisies of the Third World, rather than local populations and communities
(Rist 1996).
4.2.2 The Humanistic Turn
As mentioned, criticisms raised against the old fashion approach to development,
with its technocratic and economicistic bias, have brought back into the develop-
ment discourse an increasing attention towards non-material dimensions of pro-
cesses of societal transformation. Among the most important achievements for
development studies addressing wicked problems such as the material gap between
different areas of the globe and the more sustainable paths to transform this state of
affairs, we should mention the introduction of an increased sensitivity towards
cultural differences.
At the apogee of the development era, the concept of culture experienced many
reformulations, criticisms and rethinks within the anthropological community
itself (Wolf 1984), while other scientific fields have overlooked it completely.
The result was that cultural diversity ‘was neglected for a long time because it did
not fit in the dominant paradigm of the post-war period: rational choice theory’
(Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2010: 276). As for the development field, the acknowl-
edgement that, besides formal laws and institutions, market economies also need
‘norms or social values that promote exchange, savings, and investment’ – that is,
a correlate set of cultural, non-written patterns of thinking and believing fitting
with the economic behavior (Fukuyama 2001: 3130) – has been too often
neglected. In the aftermath of the Second World War, development programmes
aiming at the export of capitalist modes of production and consumption towards
regions whose economies were rather regulated through different mechanisms had
not paid attention to the embeddedment of economics within the social whole
(Polanyi 2001).
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Quite the opposite, nowadays cultural diversity5 can be defined as a global
discourse (Ribeiro 2007), informing a number of social sciences accounts but
still treated with scepticism by many anthropologists, especially those concerned
with cultural (Shweder 2001) and post-colonial studies (Fouge`re and Moulettes
2006).
Currently, there is a widespread awareness that ‘different cultures have different
need hierarchies’ (Hofstede 1984: 396). For example, while tackling the issue of
closing the material gap between rich and poor, we should be aware of how our
developers approach might fail to fit needs and aspirations of to-be-developed. As
far as quality of life is concerned, ‘researchers approaching the issue in ThirdWorld
countries have relied too much on definition of ‘quality’ derived from North
American and, to a lesser extent, West European countries’ (ibid.: 397). This top-
down decision-making concerning both the identification of the goals and the
one-style-fits-all model to accomplish them, is often condemned and viewed as
hierarchical and unfair by the very people who are supposed both to cooperate in
and to benefit by processes of development.
Moreover, if we adapt Hofstede’s statements on the issue of the humanisation of
work to that of development, we come up with further fruitful insights into the risks
experienced by developers attempting to offer a high quality lifestyle in accordance
with their own, particular value-standards (ibid.). This risk is still high when
development projects involve local practitioners: even developers originally com-
ing from non-western countries are often socialised to the same set of beliefs and
principles as their colleagues and peers from North America or Europe, at least with
regard to their own business.
Many Third World social scientists have been educated in North America or Western
Europe. It is difficult for them to free themselves from the ethnocentricity of the Western
approaches. This ethnocentricity is never explicit but is hidden behind ‘scientific’ verbiage.
(ibid.: 397)
In fact, since the end of nineteenth century, scientific and political paradigms
inspired by the civilising project or the idea of a white man burden, were
condemned due to their developmental or evolutionary approach to culture. How-
ever, as we have briefly mentioned, these criticisms are still being raised specifi-
cally against the use and the meaning of culture often relied upon within fields such
as development studies. This happens because misuses of the notion of culture are
common among many development specialists who still rely on the dichotomy
between modern and backward society, blaming the latter for its cultural inability to
fill the gap with the former. Thus, ‘in development economics [. . .], the view that
‘culture counts’ or that ‘culture matters’ is now popular in part because it is a
discrete way of telling ‘underdeveloped’ nations (either rightly or wrongly) that the
‘Westernization’ of their cultures is a necessary condition for economic growth’
(Shweder 2001: 3155).
5 For an extensive treatment of cultural diversity, see Meuleman, Chap. 3 of this volume.
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For instance, since the 1980s and especially the 1990s, cultural factors have been
evoked by agencies such as theWorld Bank and the IMF ‘as key variables explaining
successful transition strategies’ towards the building of market economies
(Fukuyama 2001: 3132). Asmentioned, the introduction of theHumanDevelopment
Index to measure standard of life improvements from a non-economic point of view
‘was one of the most radical paradigm shifts in development policy ever’ (Lepenies
2008: 207). This innovation, however, lost some of its revolutionary meaning once it
was appropriated by the most powerful western development agencies and thus
institutionalised from the theoretical as well as the practical point of view. Referring
to intervening variables such as human and cultural ones might imply a kind of
blaming the victim logic which does not take into account, for example, the possibil-
ity that development strategies might be useless or even harmful when pursued in
some contexts. The risk, thus, is that of a paternalistic account along the lines of: we
provided youwith the right knowledge, institutions, resources, but you have not been
able to take advantage of them due to your own cultural constraints which prevent
you from appreciating the good quality of this external help.
The point is that cultural variables as evoked by some developmentalist
narratives are often associated with the implicit universalisation of a particular
culture. Indeed, there have been scholars such as Geertz, addressing relativism by
establishing a connection between it and the value system. Furthermore, as for the
anthropological community, the joint influence of history and materialism has led
Wolf to claim that culture is ‘ideology-in-the-making’ (Wolf 1984: 399). The
unidisciplinary world-systems approach, in turn, asserts that ‘the very construction
of cultures becomes a battleground’ as it is a value- and interest-driven process,
rather than a neutral one (Wallerstein 1994: 39). In Europe, Bourdieu has stated that
the classical humanistic notion of culture refers to ‘the beliefs and behavior of the
‘dominant class”. According to him, this ‘culture’ is just a ‘culture’ amongst many
others, but it is imposed as the only legitimate one by school, universities, and other
cultural institutions’ (Harouel 2001: 3182–3).6
As we are about to see, the universalisation of a particularism reflects existent
power relationships at the international level. The ideal of material progress, a
typical trait of western culture, has been ‘exported’ specifically under the scien-
tific and practical umbrella of development thanks to the hierarchical distribution
of power among developed and underdeveloped states. Developmentalism
modernization-style has indeed been sold as a good recipe for every single
country, consistently with American capability to project its own way of life
and to stimulate consensual emulation processes at least until the end of the
twentieth century.
6 Situating culture in the frame of power (and economic) relations, however, is not a specific
feature of Marxist analyses of processes of culture production. Rather, in the 1950 and 1960s, it
also characterised functionalist approaches such as the well-known works by Talcott Parsons
(Paterson 2001).
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4.3 A New National Hegemony?
By the end of the 1980s, state-led developmentalism was dismissed due to market-
driven criticisms aimed at the failure of previous Keynesian recipes and the
corruption they had fostered among most ruling groups. Furthermore, theoretical
and empirical claims concerned with the worldwide diffusion of western liberal
values and practices as both the most desirable and realist scenario for the twenty-
first century experienced a further dissemination since the disappearance of the
Soviet Union, which brought an additional flow of Western economic and political
principles and left the United States as the lonely superpower (Huntington 1999).7
Thus, at the apogee of the Washington Consensus, structural adjustment was at
the core of most development programmes. However, development, understood as
participation in the world market and based on comparative advantage (McMichael
2004), could not represent the suitable catching-up strategy to improve the destiny
of postcolonial states
For the global economic playing field is by no means level. Its general contours were laid
out by the modern history of colonialism. [. . .] Moreover, the rules of the ‘free market’
game are, as usual, heavily skewed in favor of the most powerful players, who dominate
international associations, agencies, and agreements, from the IMF and World Bank to the
G-7 and World Trade Organization. (McCarthy 2007: 16)
Meanwhile, in spite of triumphalist western accounts of the years following the
end of the Cold War, the indisputability of American leadership over the rest of the
world proved to be quite brief. Rather, current years are marked by the decline of
unipolarism and the rise of other state and non-state actors powerful enough to impact
many areas of global governance. While, with regard to new powerful nation-states,
traditional power measures such as GDP still make some sense, the increased
involvement of non-state actors in the current process of reshaping the rules for
global governance requires a new attention to non-material sources of power.
It is true that, after the fall of the Soviet bloc, western liberal values, whose
bishop was obviously the United States, seemed to be finally free to spread across
the world. However, after the initial enthusiasm, it is becoming even clearer that the
US is losing its primacy over the rest of the world from an economic and political
point of view.
Among OECD countries, the growth of Gross Domestic Product is currently
slackening (World Bank 2010). The estimated US GDP growth was 2.4% in
2009, while, according to the World Bank, the Euro area is performing even worse.
We should notice that, around this time, several Asian countries were experiencing
a steady economic growth before September 2008 and were still weathering the
financial and economic crisis better than other economies. For instance, China and
India were growing at rates of 9.5% and 8.2%, respectively. Similarly, while
European recovery appeared the slowest (with an estimated GDP growth of 0.7%
7 See also Fukuyama (1992).
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in 2010 and 1.3% in 2011), and while the US is expected to grow approximately by
3% during the period 2010–2012, both China and India are expected to achieve a
GDP growth higher than 8.0% in 2011 (ibid.).
These figures are hardly surprising. Rather, they perfectly mirror longstanding
Western concerns regarding the economic boom of Asian countries: Japan first, the
Asian tigers next, and finally China or even India.
Among International Politics analysts, these arguments date back to the 1970s,
when several scholars stressed the relative decline in the overwhelming primacy
once enjoyed by the United States, and anticipated that the days of American
leadership were over. Indeed, the latest debates have focused on the supposed
hegemonic decline of the United States (due to its loss of economic pre-eminence
and/or ideological attraction), the identification of rising competitors (e.g. Japan,
Russia, China, India and even the EU), and the projections of upcoming interna-
tional scenarios – a new hegemony, a balance of power or a condominium of great
powers (Kupchan 2002; Sur 2002; Foot 2006; Hurrel 2006).
Hence, global leadership appears today much fragmented with regard to both the
material and the non-material dimensions of power. Indeed, beyond the traditional
measures of power, it is even more noticeable that the shift towards multipolarism is
well felt also within extra-material dimensions. Accordingly, besides the relative
distribution of economic and military power in the international structure, there is a
further point to make about the purported decline of the American ability to lead the
rest of the world. It concerns the so called soft power, the broad cultural appeal that
a powerful actor exercises over the others and through which it either gains a
hegemonic position within the international structure or, at least, strongly impacts
the rules of global governance.
A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries
want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is
just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get
others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others to
want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power behavior. It [. . .] can rest
on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that
shapes the preferences that others express. (Nye 1990: 31, emphasis added)
Nye’s now classical notion of soft power resembles, somehow, the notion of
world hegemony. The latter, indeed, when unconstrained by a positivist operatio-
nalisation of power admitting only material, measurable dimensions such as eco-
nomic and military strength, is made up by qualitative elements, too.8 Hegemony,
then, ‘refers to the attainment of ‘common sense’ status by some set of ideas and
institutions’. Furthermore, it implies the ‘rule of a class or class alliance through a
combination of consent and coercion, the capacity for a ruling bloc to set the agenda
8Among the many works making the point of the qualitative dimension of power from an IR point
of view, (see: Cox 1983; Keohane 1984; Rapkin 1990; Wallerstein 1991; The Forum 1994; Rupert
1995; Robinson 1996; Taylor 1996; Modelski 1999; Brzezinski 2004; Fontana 2006; Lentner
2006).
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for various institutions and actors without constantly resorting to force’ (Sherman
1999: 87).
That the US has relied upon immaterial sources of power until now, is a matter of
fact. What is less obvious is whether it will preserve its soft power in the near future.
In recent years, American international behaviour has led to strongly criticised
foreign policy decisions and to a reduced multilateral commitment in many issue
areas,9 such as the environment. Consistently, several analyses – some more, some
less normative – have proliferated, concerning the weight of soft power and the
need for multilateralism and eventually for a policy of burden sharing.10 Even a
former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has called for a more
universalistic model of American leadership, for
To be viewed as legitimate, that leadership has to reflect comprehensive global interests; to
be effective, it must be backed by allies with similar popular convictions and societal
values. (Brzezinski 2004: 87)
To sum up, the appeal of the American dream today appears quite doubtful, as
well as its ability to be considered the best model to emulate and thus to gain the
consensual loyalty of the so-called followers. However, even more controversial is
the issue of the purported challengers’ capability to not become hegemons them-
selves but, at least, to take the lead of global governance by means of the universa-
lisation of their own pattern for action and thought.
China does not seem able to wield a widespread cultural and ideological
attraction. First of all, it is not a democracy, which strongly invalidates its chances
of being welcomed as a leading power by other countries and to project its domestic
structure internationally as an appealing one. China, moreover, lacks any of the
welfare measures which represent the foundations of citizenship within Western
political cultures. Although social protections are more and more under attack even
in European countries, a rearrangement of liberal social democracies consistent
with Chinese political and economic architecture does not seem plausible. Finally,
with regards to the material sources of international influence, we should mention
that China’s economic growth is strongly dependent on exports, as it still lacks a
secure domestic consumption market (IMF 2009) until the full consolidation of its
own middle-class and in spite of its demographic weight; and that its military
capabilities, growing as they may be, still remain weak with respect to US military
primacy (Weber 2005).
9 The traditional anti-Americanism of a few European elites has thus turned into overt popular anti-
Americanism (Markovits 2007) – especially during the Bush administrations (Parsi 2006) – with
both a European and an extra-Western, and much bloodier, declination (Martinelli 2004). Public
disappointment is echoed in academic literature, too: in most recent years, a number of scholars
have expressed their concern about an imperial turn in US foreign policy (Jervis 2003; Golub
2004).
10 Among others, (Calleo 1987; Kennedy 1987; Mastanduno 1997; Posen 2003).
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India, for its part, has passed from the discouraging prospect of the Hindu rate
of growth, to the 1980s Hindu rate of reform, which has driven the country to its
current status of rising economic power (Boillot 2006). Unlike China, India does
not have to face international legitimacy dilemmas such as a very reproachful,
traditional neglect for addressing human rights issues; nor must it demonstrate
to other democracies that its economic development has been matched by
a consistent political development, since it is already a democracy. However,
besides noting its limited military capabilities, it is also questionable
whether India will take the lead for global governance because of its scant
achievements with regard to the fight against poverty and its progress towards
human development.
On the contrary, Europe might succeed in inheriting US strength, and in
matching it with a greater concern for matters such as social justice and environ-
ment. However, aside from the issue of their material sources of power,
Europeans seem unable to mount a cultural and moral leadership whose influence
might supersede weakened US soft power. Quite the opposite, the EU has too
often demonstrated its receptiveness of the American market discipline, as with
respect to the debate about US-style labour flexibility as well as European
rigidities and high unemployment rates. Currently, the EU risks missing the
opportunity to fill the intellectual and scientific vacuum which would pave the
way for the diffusion of fresh policy beliefs for the purpose of economic recovery
and the establishment of a new framework for governance. This happens in spite
of the link between the economic crisis and the mainstream approaches towards
managing of economic and financial matters – approaches which were inspired by
the US, before becoming a shared set of formal models and policy orientations
with universal scope. Finally, the EU suffers because of the well-known problem
of democratic deficit; it lacks a unitary political dimension, as well as a common
defence policy; furthermore, as we have seen, prospects for economic recovery of
the Euro area are not very bright.
Therefore, we are left with the puzzle that while the centre of economic power is
moving away from Washington, it does not allow us to expect the advent of a new
hegemonic nation-state able to lead the international system by means of a cultural
and normative framework. Rather, the analysis should now shift towards the rise of
non-state actors as agents able to impact the system of ideas, beliefs and biases in
many areas of global governance – and thus to impact, even indirectly – decision-
making processes with global reach. In many issue areas, theoretical accounts as
well as practical exercises of global governance are further fuelling a longstanding
dissatisfaction with methodological nationalism (Long Martello and Jasanoff
2004). Global governance, indeed, increasingly claims for the acknowledgement
of the many different actors involved, often informally, in a policy making process
which has worldwide impact (Cerny 2001). There are, first of all, non-state actors
representing either the sub- or the supra-national level to account for. Secondly, and
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especially when wicked problems are on the table, policy making involves actors
from sectors other than politics – such as scientists, entrepreneurs, stakeholders,
activists and so on.
4.3.1 Epistemic Communities and Global Knowledge
Post-war American scientific prominence in the social sciences had stunted a
genuine interest towards non-positivist analysis among IR scholars, and topics
such as non-state actors and discursive power were regularly overlooked. However,
since the 1970s, this trend is reversing with respect to both methodological nation-
alism and utilitarianism (Ruggie 1998).
Nowadays, a growing number of global politics specialists assert that methodo-
logical nationalism provides an inadequate analytical framework for examining the
contemporary reshufflings of power among national and transnational actors. In
fact, they argue that current power relations encompass more territorial levels, as
demonstrated by the flourishing debate on multilevel governance (Pattberg 2006;
Risse 2007).11 Furthermore, the dissatisfaction with the rational assumptions under-
lying the once preeminent approaches to the study of IR, has produced an increasing
interest towards ideas and beliefs (Yee 1996).
These new scientific sensitivities reveal an interesting feature of contemporary
research: the trend to overcome disciplinary boundaries of the past. Thus, after the
overspecialisation of the two more autonomous subfields of political studies,
policy analysis and international relations, we can now notice a fruitful mutual
exchange due to some interesting overlaps between their objects of research. Most
important, current scientific trends mirror the unsuitability of analyses of global
governance as exercised only within formal settings and by national actors. They,
quite the opposite, pave the way for a genuine reconsideration of who are the
main actors impacting the related processes of knowledge production and deci-
sion-making.
Hence, current political studies show an increasing interest in the role of non-
state actors such as policy networks working from outside formal political
structures (Capano and Giuliani 2005). Aside from the great differences among
the possible operationalisation of the network, there seems to be the opportunity to
identify a ‘minimal or lowest common denominator definition’ of it. Indeed, Tanja
B€orzel suggests that policy networks refer to ‘a set of relatively stable relationships
which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors,
11 Recently, and with special regard to the topic of environmental politics, a number of research
themes can be identified, as pointed out by Z€urn. They all admit that ‘international institutions do
matter, world politics is much more than intergovernmental politics and includes a wider range of
actors than states, and world politics is not only about power and material interests but is also about
nonmaterial interests, ideas, knowledge, and discourses’ (Z€urn 1998: 619).
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who share common interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to
achieve common goals’ (B€orzel 1997: 1).12
Policy analysis and international relations share a great concern for a specific
kind of network: epistemic communities. These networks are made up of experts
and technicians relying on scientific approaches and often referring to similar
interpretative and causal framework. They represent ‘a principal channel through
which consensual knowledge about causal connections is applied to policy forma-
tion and policy coordination. [. . .] As a consequence collective patterns of behavior
reflect the dominant ideas’ circulating, often supra-nationally, among epistemic
communities (Haas 2001: 11579).
Epistemic communities, thus, hold a relevant quota of soft power, for they are
able to shape the political agenda through the scientific knowledge produced in
many issue areas. Knowledge-based networks of scholars are directly involved in
the production and dissemination of scientific trends ranging from dominant eco-
nomic doctrines to legitimised knowledge and narratives concerning, for instance,
human rights, social justice and the environment. In turn, and especially when
wicked problems are on the table, politicians may draw upon these scientific
findings, provided that they are consistent with their own systems of ideas and
the available policy choices.
Members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests [. . .]. The
decision makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other
states, [. . .] informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic commu-
nity. Similarly, epistemic communities may contribute to the creation and maintenance of
social institutions that guide international behavior. (Haas 1992: 4, emphasis added)
Among the most evident feature of that knowledge production and dissemination
process, there is its clear supra-national reach. Current literature on transnational
networks ‘concerns the weight of ideas, the significance of communication along
transnational lines, and the capacity of nongovernmental groups to influence
outcomes in international politics’ (Z€urn 1998: 620). Today, working on the impact
exercised on policy making by transnational networks of knowledge-based experts
in fields such as the environment represents one of the most important contributions
made by the constructivist approach to the IR research community (Ruggie 1998).
Hence, scientific knowledge production can be described as an interactive
process, based on continuative exchanges between scientific communities dispersed
worldwide and yet linked together by similar research interests. The way knowl-
edge is produced, the actors participating in this process, and the geographical
12 Building upon the former concepts of subsystem, subgovernment, iron triangle, Anglo-
American literature has been developing the notion of network since mid twentieth century
(Jordan 1990) to better take into account how actors other than parliaments, governments,
bureaucracies and political parties participate into the process of policy making. ‘With the state
no longer being the sole entity capable of organizing society, there is a dispersion of expertise and
competence, a multiplication of channels for mediation and agreement, and the involvement of
different levels of decision-making from the local to the supranational’ (Coleman 2001: 11608).
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spaces they come from and represent, are all changing from a specialised, hierar-
chical approach to a more transdisciplinary one – which is among the most
pressuring concern of those scholars addressing the topic of knowledge democracy
and societal transformations (in ’t Veld 2010). Most innovative, non-mainstream
approaches are thus making the case for the important role played today by values-
and interests- driven actors, linked together transnationally, often socialised to a
scientific approach that, if it is not the same, is nonetheless based on the same
scientific criteria and able to influence policy making at many government levels.
This does not mean, however, that scientific research, be it produced or not in the
attempt to furnish politics with usable knowledge, is free from value biases and
pressures exercised by core power groups. Featherstone and Venn, for instance,
consider debilitating ‘the hold that western knowledge has on experts internation-
ally, globalized in the form of the social engineering advocated by international
NGOs like the World Bank and WTO and disseminated through countless courses
in universities across the world, where the knowledge is taught as authoritative and
universally valid’ (Featherstone and Venn 2006: 3).
Actually, we should be aware of the mutual influence between epistemic
communities and economic and political vested interests. We should also treasure
classical insights from the sociology of science by Merton, who has underlined
how, ‘even in those countries in which the principle of ‘freedom of science’ is
accepted, states and political decision makers clearly have an influence on the
formation of epistemic communities’ (Z€urn 1998: 645). Indeed, as claimed by
Turnhout,
Science and policy are not separate domains but continuously influence and shape each
other in dialectical processes of coproduction. [. . .] Difficulties in the relationship between
production and use of knowledge are not due to a lack of information and communication.
[. . .] Scientific controversies are often characterised by competing knowledge coalitions
that use and reject knowledge based on vested interests. (Turnhout 2010: 26)
Thus, the innovative character of studies on transnational epistemic communities
notwithstanding, this strand of literature is under attack due to ‘its uncritical, almost
blind confidence in the role of science, which is furthermore detached from the social
context and relations of power in which it is embedded’ (Epstein 2004: 49). For
instance,
Policy-making on complex issue like sustainable development is [. . .] usually a relatively
fuzzy process in which many actors in the ‘policy arena’ are involved and influence each
other. The production of knowledge to support policy-making is also not a neutral process,
but is value-laden and influenced by actors in ‘knowledge arenas’. Therefore, a strict
separation between science (‘the world of measuring’) and the policy arena (‘the world
of weighing’) is not possible. (Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2010: 267)
Not by chance, the role played by politicians, businessmen and scientists within
such a mainstream temple of knowledge as the MIT has been extensively
underlined by Taylor in his critical review of the global discourse on environmental
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problems.13 The scholar also states that too often these storylines neglect the
issue of how social, political and economic inequalities impact negatively on the
way that a truly sustainable transformation is pursued (Taylor 1997). Addressing
the topic of societal transformation then requires the acknowledgement that the
content of legitimate discourses and worldviews, as well as the process of knowl-
edge production itself, are strongly influenced by geopolitical and power
inequalities, as demonstrated by the contents, the methods and the prescriptions
elaborated in many western think tanks, research centres and institutions.
While analysing the globalization of culture and knowledge, for instance,
Featherstone and Venn suggest ‘to give greater consideration to our participation
in the globalization of western-centric knowledge’ (Featherstone and Venn 2006:
1). Odora Hoppers, in turn, draws our attention ‘to the non-neutrality of knowledge,
especially given the unequal power to pre-empt the construction of meanings and to
determine and control the rules governing speech and practise’. In her analysis of
the validity of the centre-periphery dichotomical opposition, she claims for the
‘acknowledgement of the continuing impact of global geo-politics and power
relations on the legitimation of science’ (Odora Hoppers 2000: 285).
Thus, in analysing the process of knowledge production and dissemination, we
cannot overlook the point that even the most informal and avant-garde scientific,
political and media agencies focusing on the ways sustainable transformation can
be pursued, are affected by specific power relations and must always receive a
validation feedback from the outside – usually from authoritative sources holding
the power to decide what kind of knowledge is legitimate enough to circulate and
which is not.
Moreover, since scientists ‘interact closely in a global context’ (Bunders et al.
2010: 126) and tend to adopt the same set of principles and the same approach to
scientific research worldwide, especially when transdisciplinary research is
concerned, the point of a globalised knowledge has been raised (Hulme 2010).
According to Hulme, globalised knowledge ‘erases geographical and cultural
differences [. . .]. Rather than the view from nowhere, global kinds of knowledge
claim to offer the view from everywhere’ (ibid.: 559). Taylor, for example, strongly
criticises the technocratic and moral approach of global environmentalism for it
seldom recognises local differences due to peculiar historical paths. Furthermore,
he states that a globalised understanding of sustainability tends to ignore trans-local
dynamics accounting for how each local community derives its specificities from
the continuous interaction between its own social, economic, political and cultural
features, on the one hand, and external constrains and opportunities originating
from other territorial scales worldwide (Taylor 1997).
These simplifications turn into a very critical issue while we aim to build a fairer
governance structure supporting the transformation towards a more sustainable
society. On a practical ground, it has been emphasised that sustainable development
13 (See also Long Martello and Jasanoff 2004).
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‘as practised in the developing world is largely informed by Western notions and is
often funded in accordance with the agenda of multilateral, bilateral, non-
governmental and philanthropic donor agencies from the developed countries.
This is viewed as problematic because it creates new dependencies for the devel-
oping world and raises concerns about whose agenda is being served’ (Nurse 2006:
36). Accordingly, we agree on the advisability of questioning the assumption of
networks’ neutrality with respect to vested interests – thus standing back from
Haas’ claim regarding the neutrality of epistemic communities (Haas 2001). Con-
sistently with the suggestion that knowledge is situated, it has indeed been argued
that ‘which issues are defined as meriting the world’s attention has everything to do
with who has the power and resources, including scientific ones, to press for them’
(Long Martello and Jasanoff 2004: 5). Then it seems fruitful to enlarge the analysis
of the most influential actors able to reshape the rules for global governance by
taking into account, besides scientists and decision-makers, a larger group of people
informally able to co-lead decision-making and policy implementation processes
with a worldwide impact.
Actors currently involved in the interlinked processes of knowledge production
and policy making come from political parties, lobbies, giant corporations, multi-
lateral organisations, rating agencies, media, NGOs, universities, research centres
and think tanks – as suggested by scholars focusing on many different social
sciences topics (Haas 1992; Sklair 2000; Campbell 2002; Friedrichs 2002; van
Elteren 2003; Brzezinski 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). They tend to share
similar higher education patterns and have an outward-oriented approach; in other
words, they usually belong to the same, particular cultural framework. For instance,
in spite of their legal citizenship and of their own business, we can expect most of
them to have higher education levels – often from well rated, Anglo-American style
colleges attracting a cosmopolitan attendance – and a good record of work
experiences in many parts of the world. Besides the consistency among their formal
CVs, they also tend to rely on a high, shared social capital even from a more
informal point of view.14
Hence, consistently with the transdisciplinarity through which multilevel gover-
nance of wicked problems is exercised, there is, beyond politicians and experts, a
wider range of actors to look at in order to investigate who are the most powerful
figures reshaping the rules of the game in fields such as development and
sustainability in this current era of power reshuffling. For instance, when we look
at a specific working environment such as international development, we are not
14 For example, it has interestingly been noted how scientists, politicians, lobbyists participating in
the British great season of policy change at the beginning of the twentieth century joined ‘the same
clubs, associations and other social venues’ (Campbell 2002: 31). Informal social links also play a
role in the reproduction of a working environment. For instance, ‘within the development field,
personal relations are critical in such relevant moments as recruitment of new staff members and
promotion of like-minded political allies. [. . .] Networks usually congeal into cliques’ (Ribeiro
2002: 173). Grant Jordan (1990), too, recalls the image of revolving door with reference to human
resource exchanges within stable networks.
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surprised by the many, powerful profiles involved. The development sector, defined
by Ribeiro as a power field because of the different power positions occupied by
insiders and outsiders, is said to be made up of
Local elites and leaders of social movements [. . .]; officials and politicians at all levels of
government; personnel of national, international and transnational corporations [. . .]; and
staff of international development organizations [. . .]. Institutions are also important
members of this field: they include various types of government organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, unions, multilateral agencies, industrial
entities and financial corporations. (Ribeiro 2002: 169–170)
Focusing on the broad spectrum of actors involved either in knowledge produc-
tion, decision-making or policy implementation – and stating that those processes
are intimately related – we could conceive them collectively as a kind of elite
which, well beyond scientists and politicians, also includes, for example, influential
members of the media and business sectors.
In broad terms, elites have been sociologically understood as
Small groups of people who exert substantial power and influence over the public and over
political outcomes. This power is based on the possession and control of various resources,
including economic ones [. . .], control of organizations, political supports, symbolic means
[. . .], and personal resources. (Etzioni-Halevy 2001: 4420)
Growing globalisation has paved the way for the advent of transnational elites,
because of the increased weight of multilateral organisations; the legitimacy pro-
gressively gained by several NGOs with a global range; and the proliferation of
many other political, economic and scientific fora. Transnational elites embody the
ideational and practical stances of public and private institutions, usually having
their physical headquarters in the global cities (Sassen 1991).15 They are involved
in governance processes whose reach is a multilevel one.
Most of these institutions and organisations date back to the period of unques-
tioned American leadership over Western political and economic systems and still
maintain the ideational and practical orientation of that epoch. However, they have
also been experiencing a visible de-territorialisation, which means greater reception
of non-US concerns and autonomy from their former, single mentor. This change
mirrors, first of all, the reduced international clout of the US, which justifies a
multipolar description of the current international structure of power. Secondly, the
increasing visibility of global actors tabling the needs and wills from local levels
confirms the urgency to revisit the analytical assumption of methodological
nationalism.
Studies on the superseding of nation-states as the unique and most appropriate
level of analysis are all but new. After the introduction of the notion of transna-
tional society by Raymond Aron (Aron 2003) in the 1960s, scholars such as Nye
and Keohane have pointed out transnational relations, whose key feature is the
involvement of non-governmental actors. They stated that ‘any unit of action that
15 (See also Martinelli 2005).
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attempts to exercise influence across state boundaries and possess significant
resources in a given issue area is an actor in world politics’ (Nye and Keohane
1971b: 733). The analysis of transnational relations raises, among other things, the
attitude issue. Attitudes are beliefs, norms, ‘opinions and perceptions of reality of
elites and nonelites within national societies’ (Nye and Keohane 1971a: 337).
According to Nye and Keohane, attitudes are also shaped by non-state actors, and
the process of new attitudes fostering is an asymmetrical one because only the most
affluent and powerful segments of world population ‘are able to take full advantage
of [this] network of intersocietal linkages’ (ibid.: 345).
Then, transnational elites are, even indirectly, involved in many processes
connected to global governance thanks to their participation in the stages of agenda
setting, decision-making and policy implementation and evaluation. As we are
about to see, they are also the main agents able to legitimise and disseminate
world culture.
4.3.2 Transnational Elites and World Culture
Actors such as experts and scientists specialised in the same field of knowledge
and collectively understood as an epistemic community with a supranational
reach, ‘are often responsible for generating the very ideas that constitute the
world culture’ (Campbell 2002: 30, emphasis added).
Transcending specific scientific fields, this world culture impacts the systems of
ideas and beliefs of many people, thus showing both its popular declinations – for
instance, McDonaldisation – and higher expressions, as we are about to see.
World culture refers to the cultural complex of foundational assumptions, forms of knowl-
edge, and prescriptions for action that underlie globalized flows, organizations and
institutions. It encompasses webs of significance that span the globe, conceptions of
world society and world order, and models and methods of organizing social life. (Boli
and Lechner 2001: 6261)
Recently, the idea of a world culture has been circulating insistently among
social scientists. For instance, since the last decades of the twentieth century, and
consistently with the weakening of both rational choice theory and hierarchical-
bureaucratic approaches, political scientists have devoted much attention to ‘how
ideas, that is, theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled
beliefs, and the like, affect policy making’ (Campbell 2002: 21). Surel has adopted
an encompassing label, cognitive and normative frameworks, in order to address
‘coherent systems of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given
field, ‘world views’, mechanisms of identity formation, principles of action, as well
as methodological prescriptions and practices of actors subscribing the same frame’
(Surel 2000: 496). Thus, one of the outcomes of belonging to the same frame is that
individuals share a collective consciousness, a subjective sense of belonging,
producing a specific identity’ (ibid.: 500).
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The broader definition of culture, as well as its understanding in terms of
dynamic learning processes, leads scholars such as Featherstone (1994, 2006) to
make the case for the globalization of culture. Pieterse, in turn, has outlined how
this global culture must be looked at with reference to a process of hybridization
and creolization. Outlining the continuous, relational process of mutual cultural
exchange and learning would allow us to overcome the bias concerning the
uniformity of culture. He also points out how even western culture has been
made up during the centuries trough the interaction with, and the absorption of,
other cultural forms and practices with no regard for formal political and geograph-
ical boundaries (Pieterse 1994).16
The consolidation of a global culture, moreover, should not be conceived as
referring to a simple dichotomic framework – an either-or logic between diversity
and homogeneity (Featherstone 1994) or local and global.17 In addition, it should
not refer to simple Americanisation and Westernisation. Rather, one of the main
features differentiating today’s global culture from ancient and modern processes of
cultural colonisation lies in the current lack of one or more centres from which
cultural elements irradiate (Appadurai 1994) – a validation of our hypothesis
regarding the transnational combination of elements from many different geograph-
ical scales. Hannerz, for instance, places the origins of world culture in the
‘increased interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as [in] the develop-
ment of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory’ (Hannerz 1994:
236). Smith, in turn, claims that ‘global culture would operate at several levels
simultaneously: as a cornucopia of standardized commodities, as a patchwork of
denationalized ethnic or folk motifs, as a series of generalized ‘human value and
interests’, as a uniform ‘scientific’ discourse of meaning and, finally as the interde-
pendent system of communications which forms the material base for all the other
components and levels’ (Smith 1994, 176).18
The points to be made here refer, firstly, to the cultural homogeneity of groups
cross-cutting formal national, regional or continental borders; and, secondly, to the
power differentials allowing for the primacy of a few cultural traits over others.
As pointed out by Hannerz, we might recognise cultures transcending arbitrary
territorial boundaries such as nations and regions and carried, rather, ‘as collective
structures of meaning by networks more extended in space, transnational or even
global’ (Hannerz 1994: 239). These systems of beliefs, as this scholar goes on to
say, ‘tend to be more or less clearcut occupational cultures (and are often tied to
transnational job market)’ (ibid.: 243). Hence, we can imagine most liberal
professionals involved in different fields such as politics, media, business, academy
16On the same topic of cultural contamination, (see Gruzinski 1988).
17 See Chap. 2 by in ’t Veld, this volume.
18 Appadurai, too, goes on the difference between the globalization and the homogenization of
culture stating that ‘globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization
(armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the like), which are
absorbed into local political and cultural economies’ (Appadurai 1994: 307).
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but all employed in the development sector, as belonging to a common cultural and
scientific framework. These transnational networks encompassing the realms of
politics, media and science, as well as the private business sector (Graz 2003), share
the same world culture in its highest declinations.
Then, we should stress the ideational dimension of power dynamics, which has
been too often underestimated by structural approaches (Golub 2004; Nabers 2008).
In fact, leverage on knowledge and information is a major source for the exercise of
power (Risse 2002) and, not by chance, the highworld culture shared by most of the
actors forming the transnational elite is strongly influenced by initially Western
values and beliefs, and its grounding lies in a positive bias towards market econ-
omy. Supporting the capitalist organisation of economic relations, however, also
involves a consistent vision of socio-political arrangements (Ikenberry 1992),
allowing broad grounds for social, human and environmental concerns. Indeed,
‘western-like aspirations include the desire for liberal democracy, free enterprise,
private property, autonomy, individualism, equality, and the protection of ‘natural’
or universal ‘rights” (Shweder 2001: 3156). As Blyth points out, ‘economic ideas
can create the basis of a mutual identity between differently located economic and
political agents’ (Blyth 1997: 246).
As mentioned, looking at world culture as a simple by-product of American grip
over the rest of the world would seem quite naı¨ve. Instead, with the current multi-
layered distribution of power, transnational elites project their influence at all the
levels of governance because of their grasp on a number of national and sub-
national politicians, policy advisers, lobbyists and intellectuals. Indeed, as
Overbeek states, domestic regimes and ‘internal structures of states are adjusted
so that each can best transform the global consensus into national policy and
practise’ (Overbeek 2004: 11). From their seats within public and private
institutions, transnational elites work as ‘progenitor[s] of ideas, which they suc-
cessfully spread through bringing together senior civil servants, business
executives, and technical specialists in working groups that give real substance to
the concept of epistemic community’ (ibid.: 14). Local populations, in turn, are
socialised to a set of values, beliefs and practices delivered as universalistic in spite
of their particularistic origins.19 They range from consumerism to individualism;
from faith in democratic regimes to implementation of neoliberal recipes; from a
notion of globalisation as a self-generating process to the idea of multilevel
governance as a regime enhancing local populations’ self-reliance while addressing
the most alarming global issues such as environment depletion, global warming and
energy shortage.
It can be said with certainty that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with these
values and prescriptions. However, we have previously urged giving greater atten-
tion to intangible sources of power and to non-state actors as agents of power;
similarly, we shall now stress how systems of formal and informal rules are all but
19 (See Sp€ath 2002; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007).
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neutral. Quite the opposite, they constitute hegemonic discourses framed and
delivered by the most powerful actors.
Summing up, the notion of culture is, firstly, becoming even broader to include
knowledge, beliefs, ideas, biases. In this regard, it is flowing into research areas
traditionally less sensitive to the findings of the anthropological scientific commu-
nity – as proved by the constructivist turn leading many post-positivist research
programmes. Secondly, the notion of world culture enables us to escape the fixed
borders of nation-states, by explicitly referring to many coexisting and overlapping
scales, consistently with the transnational character of both the cognitive paradigms
and the normative frameworks constraining the options perceived as either useful or
legitimate by ruling groups and other elites (Campbell 2002). Finally, as we will see
within the specific field of development, a prominent trait of this world culture is
represented by a wider inclusion of different narratives within the main story line.
Nowadays, ‘the voices and the views of the Third World are increasingly prominent
in world-cultural development’ (Boli and Lechner 2001: 6262), thus provoking
increased conflicts and fragmentation between the competing and concurrent pro-
cesses of cultural homogenization and cultural differentiation (Appadurai 1994).
Developmentalism was one of the cultural and scientific product of American
and – more generally – Western soft power, as shown by its broad application in
domains such as international power politics, national policy making, scientific
research, campaigns of NGOs, individual humanitarian concerns and the like. Since
addressing the changing nature and scope of hegemonic discourses and agents
responsible for their formulation is one of the major challenges for social sciences,
we will describe how – among the non-economic claims underpinning the current
world culture – we can recognise wicked problems such as environmentalism.
4.4 Whither Governance for Sustainable Transformation?
Since the 1970s, a vitriolic discontent with developmentalism has been circulating
among most Third Word populations.
The development process itself had displaced them from traditional lands and ways of life,
but without corresponding opportunities for absorption into the modern cash economy.
Dispossession, marginalization, hyper-urbanization, and the explosion of precarious
settlements and informal economies became symbols of a development enterprise that
had gone tragically wrong, betraying its most fundamental promises. (Carruthers 2001: 96)
While the days of developmentalism seemed to be over, today the development
machine is alive and well. How was its survival possible?
Today, the topic of international development goes hand in hand, on the theo-
retical as well as on the empirical ground, with the notion of global governance. The
latter is said to be ‘based on shared expectations, as well as on intentionally
designed institutions and mechanisms’ (Benedict 2001: 6237). Global governance
has a Western or, better, Anglo-American root (Friedrichs 2002; Martinelli 2005),
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is strictly connected to the process of globalisation (Friedrichs 2002; Pattberg 2006)
and is carried out according to the assumption that ‘human rights, monetary affairs
or security are to be governed by a global elite, because otherwise the realm of
chaos and violence [. . .] takes place’ (Sp€ath 2002: 1–2). Global governance
includes many levels for governmental functions, consistent with the current pre-
eminence of actors belonging to agencies which cut across state boundaries, with
the changing role of nation-states, and with the increasing regionalisation
connected to a multipolar structure (Pattberg 2006).20
Global governance can be understood as a common framework of principles,
rules and laws necessary to tackle decision-making in several issue areas which are
upheld by a diverse set of institutions at the sub-national, national and supra-
national levels (Benedict 2001). In spite of the claims for truly multilevel processes
of decision-making empowering local communities as depositaries of lay knowl-
edge and practices, this set of guidelines is mostly set by transnational elites. To be
sure, this is not always a unidirectional, top-down process. However, the concrete
opportunity for common people to effectively lobby top managers, chief
executives, leading politicians and intellectuals of the OECD countries remains
scarce (Risse 2002), the connections between several NGOs and grass-roots
movements notwithstanding. This is why the global character of governance
has been questioned (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007) or why it is said to create
‘new borders of inside/outside’ (Sp€ath 2002: 1). Nevertheless, similar to
developmentalism, global governance needs and actually has an ideological appeal
for many people. It entails a vertical process of interiorisation of the transnational
elites’ policy beliefs by local officials and intellectuals, thus representing a consen-
sual tool for the management of global affairs.
Accordingly, the current rules for management of matters perceived as having a
worldwide impact are mostly set by restricted inner circles whose membership is far
from mirroring old binary differentiations such as developed and developing/
underdeveloped states or western and non-western countries. This means that the
view understanding global governance as a subtle synonymous for an enduring
American leadership or, even worse, a new empire, is a very naı¨ve one.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US deployed its hegemonic
project by establishing organisations and agencies with a considerable supra-
national reach – such as the Bretton Woods and the UN institutions, as well as
the original nuclei of the OECD and WTO. At the zenith of the Pax Americana,
these institutions acted consistently with their major mentor. However, in the
course of time, they gradually started losing their territorial connotation and
attracted agents and goals from other emerging powerful players in the global
20 On the functionalist research program, pointing to neutral or, in the worst case, technocratic
expertise replacing several political tasks and responsibilities, (see Dingwerth and Pattberg 2007).
For an evaluative notion of global governance as a favourable instrument for the empowerment of
global civil society by the means of a multilevel, non-hierarchical and democratic exercise of
governmental functions, (see Scheuerman 2007).
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arena, thus incorporating competing demands and claims as the US economic pre-
eminence was declining in relative terms. For instance, the older IMF and World
Bank experienced an enhancement of their commitment towards and compliance
with economic and political concerns of transnational elites: there was a normative
turn towards neo-liberal programmes in the economic dimension (Harvey 2005)
and democracy promotion in the political one (Robinson 1996). At the same time,
new institutions for the management of world politics and economy – such as the
G7 and the Trilateral Commission, later replaced by the World Economic Forum –
were established. Finally, interventions of and prescriptions by NGOs gained
greater legitimacy, thus concurring with the present awareness for social, political
or environmental needs of several non-OECD populations.
To be sure, the Washington Consensus is not being seriously undermined, even
in the context of US economic decline relative to other powers. However, shared
goals, values and beliefs establishing common standards have evolved over the last
decades. Formal and informal rules have been adapted to one of the most important
structural changes, the end of the Cold War, as well as to the advent of new great
powers with their own international ambitions. Moreover, non-state actors such as
multinational corporations, financial agencies and international organisations have
consolidated their own roles in the process: while they had been mostly set since
late 1940s, we should actually appreciate that they have evolved through the course
of time. One of the core changes we notice with regard to leverage positions in the
context of globalisation concerns the increased assimilation of non-US officials,
purposes and values within global governance institutions. Currently, transnational
elites seem to be involved in a wide range of issue areas and frequently pursue their
own agenda through international organisations, independently from and some-
times even contrary to the declared policies of national governments. Indeed, their
American trademark notwithstanding, global governance institutions are increas-
ingly straying beyond US control because of both the institutionalisation processes
and the rise of new agents of power, be they state or non-state actors.
This dramatic political and economic turmoil challenging the international
structure of power is allowing an increased space for new criticisms within the
social sciences themselves. This is not a peculiar feature of the end of the twentieth
century. Rather, the literature linking previous hegemonic transitions and cultural
change suggests that a critical review of ‘the foundations of knowledge has
characterized each transition’ (Sherman 1999: 110).
As for development studies, we experienced the birth and the consolidation of
the modernization theory – with its assumption of a step-by-step transformation of
backward/underdeveloped societies until the goal of reproducing the western pat-
tern – in the 1950s. Not by chance, it was precisely during the post-war era that the
western pre-eminence and especially American primacy over the rest of the world
reached its zenith. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc, leaving former socialist states
with no developing model, enabled the diffusion of post-Keynesian doctrines based
on economic liberalisation and shrunk government. The modernization school
meanwhile had been by and large questioned by other schools of thought – such
as the dependencia, the e´cole de la re´gulation, and the world-systems analysis – since
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the 1970s. Following this, post theories cast many doubts on the notion of modernity
as one of the most catching all metaphors underpinning developmentalist theoretical
as well as empirical narratives.
Current diffusion of post-positivism and post-modernism signals that ‘a new
battle of the books has been engaged’ (Sherman 1999: 111). This dispute on tools
and methodologies is consistent with the weakening of the old positivist monop-
oly related to the Western, hegemonic worldview. Among the many outcomes of
the current intellectual and scientific turmoil – named by Cerny (2001) as a small
kuhnian revolution – we should notice an increased consideration of ideological
and cultural factors underpinning scientific knowledge production and dissemina-
tion, as well as the most popular systems of ideas and beliefs. A growing number
of social analysts are paying greater attention to how cultural elements might
mediate or even influence trends and phenomena into the social, political, eco-
nomic as well as scientific arena. Since the 1990s, the post-development
approach, for example, has made a strong case for the interaction between
power and knowledge within the development field, claiming that ‘the knowledge
deployed in development is a product of epistemic perspectives of the ‘West”
(Jakimow 2008: 312).
Furthermore, growing criticisms against modernization and developmentalism,
have led to greater attention being paid not only to the human dimensions of
development but to the environmental ones as well. Sustainable development
. . . became part of the critique of neo-liberal development models [. . .]. In this sense the
sustainable development paradigm should be viewed as [. . .] part of the growth of new
social movements and the rising wave of discontent with conventional development theory
and practice. (Nurse 2006: 35)
As pointed out by Du Pisani, environmental damage, natural resources exploita-
tion and population growth were concerns already raised in many classical books.
However, they have become truly popular issues only in the second half of the
twentieth century, when ‘the Enlightenment promise of the linear and continuous
improvement of the human condition had proved to be a Myth of Progress, because
it was based on human hopes and aspirations rather than human potentialities and
limitations’ (Du Pisani 2006: 89).
Hence, since the beginning of the 1960s, western people’s consciences were
shocked by the publication of Silent Spring, which cast a shadow on that phase of
economic boom. In 1968, Garret Hardin tabled the Malthusian issue of the expo-
nential growth of the population size. The tragedy of the commons, the paper said, is
related to the inevitable destruction of those common-pool resources by the users:
‘a finite world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth
must eventually equal zero’ (Hardin 1968: 1243).
During this initial phase, the United States took the lead of the rising green
politics. Consistently with its international primacy, it demonstrated its potential for
innovation in that new field of policy, thus stimulating, in turn, the distinguishing
emulative effect that great powers are able to set in motion with regard to their own
innovations. The US:
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. . . was one of the first leading industrialized nations to develop comprehensive environ-
mental legislation and regulatory institutions. [. . .] Much of this state activity was
underpinned by the world’s most dynamic environmental movement, which came into
existence in the mid-1960s. US environmental groups ranging from the more traditional
bodies [. . .] to modern environmental nongovernmental organizations [. . .] worked to
create broadly based domestic support for a more ambitious environmental policy at
home and abroad. US scientists and activists came to play a leading role in the global
environmental movement that began to emerge in the 1970s. (Falkner 2005: 590)
Over time, however, the US shifted towards a reduced commitment in the
environmentalist field, acting sometimes even as a veto power. In spite of that,
green initiatives were in the meantime being emulated by other countries. Many
cultural meanings of development, questioning the often unsustainable western
equation between it and economic growth, had begun to circulate outside few,
narrow and heterodox strands of literature and social movements. Green
sensibilities flowed into the official discourse proposed via science, media, politics
and business; at the same time, an environmentalist awareness grew among middle
and especially upper classes all over the world. Among the core agents of change –
whose common trait is the global reach – a critical role for the aim of a new
sustainability paradigm might be assigned to the ‘wide public awareness of the
need for change and the spread of values that underscore quality of life, human
solidarity and environmental sustainability’ (Global Scenario Group 2002: X)
At the end of the day, in spite of many dramatic changes experienced by the
global structure of power and of the rise of new intellectual trends, the development
discourse had found a way to keep afloat by co-opting in its rhetoric pre-existing
environmental concerns: ‘Green thinking about sustainability, a radical position 15
or so years ago, has long been institutionalized as ‘sustainable development”
(Pieterse 1998: 350). Public environmental awareness, defined by Levy (1997) as
a challenge to hegemony, has thus been co-opted into the hegemonic discourse
itself.
4.4.1 The Institutional Discovery of Environmentalism
In 1968, the UNGeneral Assembly launched the project of the Human Environment
Conference. Under the leadership of Maurice Strong, it was held 4 years later,
representing the first international acknowledgement of the need to address envi-
ronmental problems – mainly, pollution and acid rains. Kanie and Haas, thus, link
the date of the Stockholm conference to the beginning of the ‘institutionalization
of international environmental policy-making’, whose narrow focus was, at that
time, ‘on the conservation and management of natural resources’ (Kanie and Haas
2004: 1).
The same year, the newly established Group of Rome was laying the foundations
of a holistic understanding of the links between phenomena such as industrial
activities, natural resources deterioration and environmental exploitation. One of
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the core findings of their work regards the clear acknowledgement of earth’s
limitedness. Thereafter, ‘their ‘limits to growth’ arguments were successfully
used, on occasions, to challenge the dominant Enlightenment ideal of progress,
which could only ultimately be sustained by pursuing industrial and technological
growth wherever and whenever, at all costs’ (Doyle 1998: 772).21
However, the political and economic international shocks of the 1970s opened a
window of opportunity for once isolated environmental warnings to reach the
general public, the broader scientific community as well as the more open-minded
figures of politics and business. It was during this hard decade that ‘proto-
sustainability gained real social momentum via populist Green movements in
America and Europe when global catastrophe seemed to be imminent’ (Petrucci
2002: 104).
The 1975 Dag Hammarskj€old Report on Development and International Coop-
eration seems to represent one of the more challenging documents of the decade.
Perhaps this is the reason why it has been left mainly unmentioned; on the contrary,
it deserves more than a brief mention here.
What now was prepared for a Special Session of the UN General Assembly and
wishes for another development – a need-oriented, endogenous, self-reliant and
environment-friendly development, that is, a qualitative one – to overcome the
crisis of contemporary development, whose little successes had been achieved only
with regard to ‘the privileged minorities who remain in most parts of the Third
World [. . .]. For them the ‘gap’ has been bridged’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report
1975: 37).
The report, thus, takes its cue from the recognition of a critical situation, to be
looked at as a whole made up of ‘a few dominating countries and the majority of
dominated countries’, tied up by unfair, exploitative economic links (ibid.: 5).22
Analysing the potential for structural transformation, it clearly states that the most
critical point does not relate to resources’ limits, but to their asymmetrical and
unjust distribution, an obvious but too often downplayed outcome of economic,
political and cultural power differences at the international level.23 Given the
‘diversity of starting points’ (ibid.: 35) among the nations, the idea of a one-style-
fits-all model is rejected; rather, ‘the plurality of roads to development answers to
21 For an extensive treatment of the debate raised by The Limits to Growth (and then by Our
Common Future), see Chap. 4 by Perez-Carmona, this volume.
22 ‘The crises are the result of a system of exploitation which profits a power structure based
largely in the industrialized world, although not without annexes in the Third World: ruling ‘e´lites’
of most countries are both accomplices and rivals at the same time’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report
1975: 5).
23 ‘Sometimes, transgression of the limits results directly from a system of un equal economic
relations: peasants deprived of accessed to fertile soils monopolized by large land-owners or by
foreign companies have no other resource but the cultivation of marginal zones, contributing to
erosion, deforestation and soil exhaustion, while consumption by the rich, modelled on that of the
industrialized societies, adds the pollution of wealth to that of misery. An unequal distribution of
wealth threatens the outer limits from both sides at once’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report 1975: 37).
192 J. Napolitano
the specificity of cultural or natural situations’ (ibid.: 7), which should be
opportunely enhanced through processes of multilevel democratisation and
decentralisation.
Arguing for ‘radical changes in development policies and in international
relations’ (ibid.: 105), this report came up with policy proposals that would have
produced, besides a number of green side-effects, an increased government
involvement in the production and management of goods. As for the most affluent
regions of the world, the pillars of the sustainable transformation envisioned by the
authors refer to ceilings on, and price control of, meat and oil consumption;
rationalisation of living units to be built as greenhouses; a less consumerist
approach to consumer goods and the selling, on a non-profit basis, of high quality
basic commodities; the abolition of private cars, to be replaced with public trans-
portation in city centres and motor-cars rented by public owned companies for long
drives. With regard to Third World countries,
At the socio-economic level the reform implies ownership or control by the producers [. . .]
of the means of production [. . .]. Commercial and financial structures must equally be
changed in such a manner as to prevent the appropriation of the economic surplus by a
minority. At the political level, the reform of structures means the democratization of
power. [. . .] This is only possible through a thoroughgoing decentralization [. . .]. In other
words, each local community should be able, on the basis of self-reliance and eco-
development, to manage its own affairs and to enter into relations on equal footing with
others. (ibid.: 38–39)
Quite the opposite, a first glance at 1980s economic theories prevailing among
the main international institutions traditionally in charge of the delivering and
administration of magic recipes to developing countries, would let to conclude
that that was the decade of structural adjustment.
However, going beyond that still economistic understanding of development
drawn upon by agencies such as the World Bank and especially the IMF, we notice
that something was changing in the consciences of the more enlightened sections of
science, politics, media and business.
In 1986, after the Chernobyl disaster had shocked the world, Our Common
Future was published, stemming from the work of the World Commission on
Environment and Development chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland. The report
focused on the link between social and economic development, on the one hand,
and human environment and natural resources, on the other – thus building on the
suggestions and findings of the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The Brundtland
Commission questioned the old assumption that ‘economic objectives, such as
poverty alleviation and economic growth, should take precedence over environ-
mental concerns’, thus paving the way for current ‘integrative and holistic manage-
ment approaches’ (Jabareen 2008: 185).
The Brundtland Report admitted the existence of natural limits; nonetheless, it
also envisioned the chance to overcome them thanks to technical improvements and
economic growth. Overall, northern lifestyle was not disputed: those affluent
countries should pursue the target of a 3–4% economic growth, thus helping both
the general economic activities worldwide and the recovery of poorer countries.
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According to Rist, the Commission succeeded in outlining the imbalances menac-
ing human beings. However, it missed topics such as mutual exchanges between
societies and environment, and the cultural and historical dimensions of growth.
This meant that the Brundtland Report was unable to come up with serious
proposals for the solutions of said dilemmas (Rist 1996).
Almost 20-years on, an evaluation of the impact of Our Common Future states
that critics were right in raising the problems of uneven power relations and,
especially, of the ‘fundamental contradictions between the renewed call for eco-
nomic growth in developing countries and enhanced levels of ecological conserva-
tion’ (Sneddon et al. 2006: 254). However, the non-mutual exclusion between
economic growth and nature respect and preservation had been definitively
legitimised at the international level thanks to one of the most mediatised event
of the 1990s, the Earth Summit (Carruthers 2001; Bernstein 2002).
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
welcomed almost 30,000 people, coming from national governments, NGOs, and
the business sector.24 On the UN side, besides the third generation rights and
principles enumerated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
the endorsement of the programme contained in the final text of Agenda 21must be
mentioned. Instead of the strict separation between environmental, social and
economic dimensions, ‘it proposed integrated systems of management to ensure
that environmental, social and economic factors are considered together in a
framework for SD’ (Jabareen 2008: 186). At the local, national and international
level, the implementation of the programme for the century to come was supposed
to strongly rely on initiatives and ameliorations achieved by science, technology,
education and economy. Accordingly, Agenda 21 launched an innovative vision of
transdisciplinary, multilevel governance for sustainable development, referred to as
the procedural component of sustainable development by Kanie (2007).25
Summing up, by the end of the century, green concerns experienced a broaden-
ing of scale, from the local level to the global one (Levy 1997; Carruthers 2001).
Sustainability ‘has become the central adage of environmental policies around the
24Among the documents produced by representatives of the civil society gathering around the
Global Forum at Rio de Janeiro, there was Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on
Development, a report written by the Business Council on Sustainability. It exemplifies, with its
technocratic and mainstream understanding of sustainable development as a combination of
economic growth and environmental preservation, the new interest towards environmentalism
among multinational corporations. For a network analysis of the corporate/policy interlocks with
regard to the WBCSD as one of the most influent transnational policy groups, (see Carrol and
Carson 2003). From a more general point of view, an increased involvement of private firms as
sustainability partners has been wished for in Daily and Walker (2000) and critically analysed in
Levy (1997).
25 Kanie notices the request for a ‘broader participation in decision making. Sustainable develop-
ment is no longer the pure domain of national sovereignty. Agenda 21 calls for multiple stake-
holder participation, or ‘major groups’, at multiple levels of international discussions, including
NGOs, scientists, business/industry, farmers, workers/trade unions, local authorities, as well as
indigenous people, women, and youth and children’ (Kanie 2007: 70).
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globe, and the environmental discourse has been globalized and transcended
national boundaries’ (Jabareen 2008: 187), thus being subsumed by the exercise
of global governance. Moreover, the echo of Our Common Future has gone down
well with the specialised inner circles of development, and started reaching western
middle and especially upper classes consciences, thus affecting their sensitivities
and belief systems. Indeed,
Since the UN Summit 1992 in Rio de Janeiro the agenda of sustainable development is
programmatically linked to the inclusive and consensus-orientated decision-making that
gets people involved as actors rather than only as voters, and that gets sustainability
thinking mainstreamed in parliaments, the private sector, and science and humanities.
(T€opfer and Bachmann 2010: 58–9, emphasis added)
4.4.2 Mainstreaming Sustainability
Accompanied by liberal democracy and free markets, sustainable development is now a
pillar of contemporary universalism, embraced from industrialized north, to the less-
developed south, to the post-communist east. (Carruthers 2001: 93)
The new century approach to development, with its joint interest in the material
well-being of the poorer, the ‘traditional’ cultural systems of non-western people
and the preservation of natural environment and resources, strongly requires a
change of perspective. After the rigid disciplinary specialisation dominating exactly
when the developmentalist story-line was set, today coping with development
studies requires genuine but challenging exchanges and comparisons between as
many fields of knowledge as possible. Besides this interdisciplinary enhancement
on the scientific side, we can also notice a trandisciplinary shift with reference to the
increasing institutionalisation of partnerships between science, politics, business
and so on (Bunders et al. 2010). Furthermore, scholars and practitioners have begun
to enrich their analysis with factors and variables once neglected such as non-
material dimensions and non-state actors. Sustainable development is certainly one
of these wicked problems requiring the empowerment of actors belonging to
different circles and geographical levels as well as the promotion of different
cultural settings and belief structures. A genuine governance towards sustainable
transformation requires that local contexts have always to be allowed for, since any
specific place has its own characteristics and ‘what is thought of as ‘sustainable’ is
often dependent on assumptions and values’ (T€opfer and Bachmann 2010: 60).26
26 Indeed, for example, during a 1996 conference joined by the Environment and Developing
Areas Research Groups of the IBG ‘speakers analysed how far researchers can collect information
about environmental change and physical processes in a manner which allows researchers to be
aware also of their own social and cultural settings’. Moreover, they underlined the need to reform
the knowledge production processes in the environmental field in order to ‘enable new agendas to
emerge, that might support previously unrepresented groups’ (Batterbury et al. 1997: 126).
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As mentioned, Western developers have discovered a new interest in local
traditions and cultures underpinning lifestyles whose environmental impact seems
less dangerous than the western one. Besides the realms of politics and science,
media too have engaged in the processes of knowledge production for sustainable
development within knowledge democracies, thus affecting the following process
of decision making. Finally, environmental concerns are being incorporated into the
vision and the strategy of many private, profit seeking firms, too. To sum up, as
noticed by Du Pisani, even before the 1970s economic downturn,
Ecological disasters received much media publicity. Films, TV programmes and pop music
popularized the idea of an imminent ecological crisis. Earth Day was celebrated for the first
time in 1970. The Green Movement took off, the first environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs), Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, were established, environ-
mental groups became more outspoken, ecologism became an ideology of some importance
and green political parties started making an impact. (Du Pisani 2006: 89)
Hence, our thesis is that the acceptance of the environmental issue among
decision-makers has followed the outside initiative model diffused, according to
Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976), into egalitarian contexts. Strongly felt, at the begin-
ning, among a few sectors of the civil society – such as activists and grass-roots
movements – collectively referred to as anti-systemic movement, environmental-
ism has entered the public and, finally, the formal agenda. ‘The language of
sustainability was once a discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental
consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise. It
provoked challenging questions about scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty,
global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’. It has passed,
however, from opposition to orthodoxy, argues Carruthers (2001: 93).
Of course, the rise of the environmentalist issue at the top of the policy agenda
mirrored the difficult circumstances of the times and the absence of good
alternatives: ‘there were few ideational competitors. Resource management bodies
had traditionally been staffed by neoclassical economists and resource managers,
who had been discredited by broadly publicized environmental disasters and the
energy crisis of the 1970s as well as the limits to growth debate, [. . .] and attendant
popular fears of widespread resource depletion’ (Haas 2001: 11584).
Anyhow, as far as our knowledge democracies are concerned, we might maybe
see the glass at least as half full compared to the post II World War times. It is true
that ‘poorer and more peripheral societies are less able to bring their cultural models
to the world-cultural table, but many participants in the global arena from richer
societies have become strong advocates of the poor and peripheral’ (Boli and
Lechner 2001: 6264). Indeed, transnational elites involved into the development
business are more aware than before of the need to take into account different
development paths and to discard the previous dominating focus on material and
economic factors. ‘New formulations – grassroots development, pro-peasant devel-
opment, eco-development, bottom-up development, people-centered development,
and so forth – opened up myriad paths in the quest to conceive an alternative,
ecologically sustainable, socially-just development trajectory for the South’
(Carruthers 2001: 96). Development discourses have also incorporated a noticeable
196 J. Napolitano
concern for matters of inter-generational equity and justice. As synthesised within
the three Ps strategy, calling for economic, social and environmental responsi-
bilities, development processes and transformations must pursue the joint goals of
Profit, People and Planet, with a careful evaluation of long-term outcomes produced
by policy implementation. Consistently, 1990s scientific literature ‘presented
evidence to show how environmental problems in developing countries are not
the result of short-term impacts of rising population or economic growth,
but instead the result of complex long-term human-environment interactions’
(Batterbury et al. 1997: 127).
Global governance for a more environmentally friendly management of the
twentieth century changes at the economic, political and social levels seems to
have more chance of success than in the previous epochs of great transformations.
The broad goal of sustainability has been adopted worldwide, thus facilitating the
embracing of green policy alternatives that would have found many vetoes only a
couple of decades ago. Haas can thus evoke a ‘consensual wisdom within the
international community of environmental policy analysts’. They share, indeed, a
simultaneous concern for environmental degradation, economic growth and the
material gap between the richest and the poorest segments of world population. The
new policy doctrine associated to sustainability ‘argues that most social ills are
nondecomposable, and that environmental degradation cannot be addressed without
confronting the human activities that give rise to it. Thus sustainable development
dramatically expanded the international agenda by arguing that these issues needed
to be simultaneously addressed, and that policies should seek to focus on the
interactive effects between them’ (Haas 2004: 570). This picture, however, also
has a negative side.
There is also the view that mainstream notions of sustainable development co-opt rather
than challenge, for example, neo-liberal economic hegemony because it shares a similar
foundational premise as hegemonic development approaches in that it still prioritizes
capital accumulation, for example, concepts like growth and efficiency remain part of the
sustainable development discourse. [. . .] Mainstream notions of sustainable development
fall within the narrow confines of modernization theories of development which prioritizes
an image and vision of development scripted in the tenets of Western technological
civilization that is often promoted as the ‘universal’ and the ‘obvious’. What it does is to
legitimize so-called modern Western values and to delegitimize alternative value systems
thereby constructing a global cultural asymmetry between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest.’ (Nurse
2006: 35)27
And what is more, even after sustainability gained its current status of buzzword
in the 1990s, ‘the Northern way of life – with all its internal contradictions and
stresses – remained on a non-negotiable track’ (Petrucci 2002: 105). On the other
hand, most of the local roads to sustainability sometimes compete with western
theoretical and empirical understanding of (sustainable) development itself. For
instance, local communities whose lifestyles are at odds with the tenets of individ-
ualism, hierarchy and commodification are often the real inhabitants of
27 For a radicalisation of the opposition between the West and the Rest, (see Huntington 1997).
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geographical areas representing a strategic environmental resource for the entire
globe; they know how to take care of these environments and landscapes in a way
which is consistent with their own beliefs and values systems.
Quite the opposite, common use of the notion of sustainable development
involves, implicitly or explicitly, an enduring reference to notions of industria-
lisation and modernisation which are, in turn, linked to the idea of economic
progress (Nurse 2006). Consistently, ‘quality of human life is routinely measured
in terms of access to, and possession of, tangible objects, particularly manufactured
goods’ (Frazier 1997: 184).
Thus, it seems correct to conclude that the developmentalist worldview has been
gradually reformed, rather than revolutionised. Decades of dramatic challenges
have produced many adjustments, but have not succeeded in eradicating the
developmentalist forma mentis from the cultural and scientific systems of beliefs
shared by the most important actors in charge of global governance and thus
assimilated by a vast majority of global citizens. These reformative changes
affecting the developmentalist weltanschauung might be understood by referring
to the Gramscian notion of transformism, ‘the cooptation of potential leaders of
subaltern groups and the assimilation in a more innocuous form of their most
subversive discourse. Transformism is an integral part of a managerial understand-
ing of power seeking to rebalance the deep social tensions arising out of global
capitalism’ (Graz 2003: 327).
Environmentalism had been downplayed by mainstream knowledge, science,
politics, business and media as a critical counter-discourse carried out by grass root
groups in the non-western world and by social movements in western(ised)
countries. Actually, it has now been assimilated as a legitimate aim within the
development discourse. The latter, however, is not fully consistent with the original
needs and wills of many local communities:
Southern grassroots movements, in particular, regard global environmental managers and
their powerful state allies as focused on managing the global environment to ensure the
profitability of global economic activity. (McMichael 2004: 253–254)
The point to make here is that the co-optation of the more radical understandings
of environmentalism would have meant a critical review of the capitalist mode of
production, which is based on material growth. In fact, as claimed more than 20
years ago, potential public problems win the race for societal attention due to ‘a
complex organizational and cultural competition’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 58)
and the selection of social problems is strongly influenced by their fitness with
‘shared cultural preoccupations and political biases’ (ibid.: 64). In addition, current
analyses also stress that
New ideas must find some ‘fitness’ with the existing international social structure – or
broader sets of institutionalized norms already accepted as legitimate bases of governance
in the international system. (Bernstein 2002: 8)
Thus, the incorporation of sustainability into the mainstream storyline has been
made by establishing the feasibility of two different goals, regarded by many as
strongly conflicting: economic growth and nature preservation. ‘For the Northern
governments and multinationals, this form of sustainability has the allure of
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requiring very little actually to change, particularly in terms of key values that
continue to be expressed, in spite of some policy concessions, throughout the global
political economy’ (Petrucci 2002: 105). Bernstein, thus, makes the case for the
compromise of liberal environmentalism, built upon the findings of the 1992 Rio
Summit, which ‘has enabled environmental concerns to rise to a much more
prominent place on the international agenda that would otherwise have been
possible, even if the original goals and transformative hopes of global environmen-
talism have been altered in the process’ (Bernstein 2002: 2).
The progressive overlap among mainstream, on the one hand, and human and
social concerns, on the other, can be tracked in the past decades, as implicitly
suggested by Rist (1996). Since the 1970s, an interesting alliance was reached
among NGOs and the development establishment represented mainly by the World
Bank through the diffusion of the basic needs approach – as already mentioned.
Following this, in the 1980s, the antagonism between UN style programmes, on the
one hand, and the economic and policy recipes originating from agencies such
as the World Bank and especially the IMF, on the other, could be overcome as
structural adjustment began to be understood in both the institutional settings as
structural adjustment with human face. Finally, ‘sustainable development ideas
found support within other UN institutions previously reluctant to incorporate
environmental concerns, such as the World Bank, which could now formulate
environmental policies that it viewed as consistent with its broader goals of
promoting economic growth and liberalization’ (Bernstein 2002: 10). Currently,
the general notion of human development – capturing many non-economic
dimensions such as sustainability – has reached a general acknowledgement,
which leaves, at least in rhetoric, almost in a marginalised position the tougher
stances of the IMF and more in general Northern radical liberalist views stemming
from the Washington Consensus.28
Because the new sustainability no longer threatens other priorities, First World
governments are just as pleased as their southern counterparts to grant it a high institutional
and policy profile. So too have supranational bodies, including the United Nations, the
OECD, the World Bank, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Area.
Because it emphasizes technology, private initiative, and enhanced market competition,
business leaders have also responded, eager to shake off the image of rapaciousness and be
refashioned as defenders of nature. Finally, sustainable development is most concretely a
reality in the transnational universe of NGOs, from the smallest local grassroots
organizations in the shantytowns of the Third World, through the middle terrain of
28 The human development trend, however, does not fail in rising criticisms, at least within the
scientific community. It has been labeled, for example, as a final insult by Doyle, for its insisting
that ‘poor training and lack of ‘human development’ have led to these inequities; not maldistribu-
tion or exploitation by transnational corporations and elites existing both in the North and the
South’. This kind of blaming the victim approach mostly circulating among elitarian groups,
Doyle goes on, claims for a learning process enabling people to endorse the sustainability
discourse everywhere: ‘this is Northern imperialism, using the language of ecology as its vessel’
(Doyle 1998: 782).
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supportive intermediary organizations, up to the gleaming offices of the wealthy interna-
tional organizations of the north. (Carruthers 2001: 102)
Currently, a distinction between two environmentalist lines is quite common in
scientific debates. For example, Gilbert Rist’s analysis of the legitimation of the
environmentalist trend followed the publication of Our Common Future and the
Earth Summit outlines a contradiction between two main environmentalist houses.
The first group seems willing to accept production increases as long as they respect
the ecosystem, and thus to recognise the need to respect external limits to human
(and economic) activities (Rist 1996). This approach resembles the doctrine of deep
ecology which, according to Jabareen (2008), valorises the intrinsic right of nature.
It is also very close to environmental sensitivities of some grass-roots movements,
focusing on ‘the growing conflict on the margins between local cultures and the
global market’ (McMichael 2004: 249) and strongly criticizing attempts by both
states and firms ‘to ‘monetize’ and harvest natural resources on which human
communities depend’ (ibid.: 247). According to Goodin, often this ‘environmental-
ist action takes the form of protest politics’, thus resembling other contemporary
social movements with which environmentalists ‘share the same broad concern
[. . .] with the socioeconomic institutions of contemporary capitalism and the
acquisitive, materialist values underlying them’ (Goodin 2001: 4686).
On the other side, the mainstream understanding of sustainable development
remains focused on the universalisation of a faster pattern of economic growth (Rist
1996), consistent with Jabareen’s doctrines of light ecology, which tend to the
domination of nature (Jabareen 2008). Here, environmentalists’ key claims refer to
a better regulation of natural damages triggered by economic growth, and ‘chal-
lenge the assumptions and practices of unbridled economic growth, arguing for
scaling back to a renewable economic system of resource use’ (McMichael 2004:
246).
Generally speaking, that latter strand of environmentalism does not seem seri-
ously interested in negotiating the life patterns of the richest segment of the world
population. Rather,
Since attaining intragenerational equity requires immediate adjustments in power and
wealth within the present generation [. . .], the sacrifices contemporary individuals would
have to make can be avoided by deferring the equity issue to the future, when members of
coming generations will have to make even greater sacrifices. (Frazier 1997: 187)
Thus, this approach is almost forced to rely, at least rhetorically, on the goal of
the universalisation of a lifestyle currently enjoyed by a small minority of the world
population. This aim, however, encounters some strong limitations from both the
environmental and the distributional points of view. First of all, it seems doubtful
that the current models of production and consumption – beneficiating a small
segment of the world population – are sustainable in the long run. Then, there is of
course the point of intra-generational equity, whose urgency had been already
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outlined by the Dag Hammarskj€old Report.29 This argument is often disregarded in
favour of the inter-generational one. However, if we are unable to set a fairer
agenda for the present, the respect of the rights and the needs of future generations
become a lot harder to achieve.
Thus, while addressing the issue of the current unjust distribution of resources,
we are left with the auspice to universalise as soon as possible the wellbeing of the
smallest fraction of the world population. This wishful thinking seems to have been
fully absorbed within the current global culture. Unluckily, this goal is an unsus-
tainable one!
Current rates of growth in the consumption and transformation of environmental resources
are threatening the sustainability of this life support system and of our security. (T€opfer
2004: 1)
Herman Daly, for instance, considers sustainable development as a ‘synonym for
the oxymoronic ‘sustainable growth”, which represents, in turn, an impossibility
theorem (Daly 2010: 12) since, as pointed out by Carruthers,
The planet could not handle, ecologically, the universalization of a European or North
American mass-consumption lifestyle. [. . .] Global sustainability would ultimately require
facing up to the formidable political challenge of a significant redistribution of wealth and
resource use. (Carruthers 2001: 95)
Again:
Our way of life is unglobalizable; ‘levelling up’ all national economies to approach the
production and consumption patterns of the most developed would make the planet
uninhabitable. In particular, the levels of resource depletion and environmental degradation
they entail are physically unsustainable. (McCarthy 2007: 26)
Finally:
Any increase in [the poor’s] share of resource implies a colossal change in accessibility as
well as in processes of distribution and allocation. However, material reserves are finite;
consequently, a major change in allocation will mean increasing resources in some places
while limiting or decreasing them in others. (Frazier 1997: 185)
Put simply, alleviating poverty (development) without destroying natural
environments (sustainability) would require, by and large, a reversal of the current
patterns of consumption, rather than the globalisation of the high-consumption
lifestyle. Taking a longitudinal approach different from the one pointing out the
current, simultaneous presence of two environmentalist houses, a 2002 report
focusing on great transition claims that ‘the first wave of sustainability activity,
in progress since the Earth Summit of 1992, is insufficient to alter alarming global
developments. [. . .] A new sustainability paradigm would challenge both the
viability and the desirability of conventional values, economic structures and social
arrangements’ (Global Scenario Group 2002: X).
29 As the redistribution of resources is concerned, ‘it will be too late tomorrow to seek new
solutions. The future depends on choices made now’ (Dag Hammarskj€old Report 1975: 26).
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The environmental and distributive dilemma raised by reformist environmental-
ism willing to green the economy and not the whole societal organisation is not
accidental. Quite the opposite, this state of affairs is a direct consequence of the
diffusion of environmental awareness of the last decades.
Greening the developmentalist discourse has meant, first of all, a public attention
towards environmental damages. However, as we have seen, it has done so by
incorporating into that approach concerns, originally expressed by anti-systemic
movements, that do not go as far as to challenge the common view of the growth
imperative. Jabareen, using a conceptual analysis methodology, finds that linking
the notion of sustainability to that of development has meant a change of focus from
environment to capitalist economy. This ethical paradox implies that sustainable
development ‘is accordingly deemed able to cope with the ecological crisis without
affecting the existing economic relationships of power. Capitalism and ecology are
no longer contradictory when brought together under the banner of SD’ (Jabareen
2008: 181–2).
The so-called alternative soul of the post development approach to global
inequalities has thus lost its more critical features while being incorporated within
a unique, mainstream approach to development. The old opposition between
alternative and mainstream development has been replaced by a weaker opposition
within the mainstream itself. Since the 1990s, ‘several features of alternative
development – the commitment to participation, sustainability, equity – are being
shared (and unevenly practiced), not merely in the world of NGOs but from UN
agencies all the way to the World Bank’ (Pieterse 1998: 370). The continuum
within current development discourse, then, runs from the human and social
approach to the recipe of structural adjustment. ‘Institutionally this rift runs
between the UN agencies and the IMF, with the World Bank – precariously –
straddled somewhere in the middle’ (ibid.: 360).
In order to tackle the environmental degradation, our current approach to policy-
making requires, instead, a more radical ‘approach to governance – a paradigm shift
in the way that governance is carried out and decisions are made and implemented’
(T€opfer 2004: 2). In other words, there is still a long way to go if we want to adjust
current cultural understanding and technical practice of governance to the goal of
sustainable transformation.
4.5 Summary
In the aftermath of the Second World War, within the international framework of
bipolarism, the goal of development as the main strategy to be pursued by new
independent states was set. In fact, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this
aim has definitively been transformed into the ambition of Sustainable Develop-
ment, a more encompassing process of societal transformation to be experienced by
every human community in the new framework of a multipolar and chaotic
international setting.
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What has happened over the past half century? This chapter has attempted to
explore the process of mainstreaming sustainable development, critically examin-
ing its roots and thus looking at its progenitor, the developmentalist approach.
Situating that discourse in the broader picture of power changes at the international
level, we appreciate how we have moved from a very restricted understanding of
development to a multidimensional, qualitative concept.
The original developmentalist programme has been analysed with special regard
to the modernization school, a twentieth century American version of evolutionism,
which has underpinned this discourse both in academic theories and empirical
practices in a specific international environment, the Cold War.
Currently, we tend to describe, in spite of the post 1989 claims of enduring
unipolarity, the current structure of power as a multipolar one, especially from the
economic point of view. However, this does not mean that we are about to see the
rise of a new hegemonic country able to produce an agreed scientific worldview and
to shape popular sets of ideas and beliefs about how the world should work and
actually works. In other words, economic multipolarism is not matched by the rise
of a powerful nation-state whose scientific mainstream in the development sector
has been universalised as the dominant paradigm and whose lifestyle, broadly
understood, has stimulated consensual emulation abroad. Soft power, quite the
opposite, appears much more fragmented than in the past.
Today, recognising the main decision-makers is a hard task, consistently with
the increasing overlapping of both institutional and informal power loci at the
international level. In many issue areas, such as those related to environment,
theoretical works on, and practical exercise of, global governance are stimulating
a review of the old assumption of methodological nationalism. Besides the
flourishing of sub- and supra-national government levels, many other actors from
any geographical scale are engaged in the current process of laying the foundations
for the governance of issues perceived as global, even in spite of their possible local
origins. The increasing role of organisations, agencies and institutions, far from
embodying a simple American worldview, reflects both the multipolar character of
the international structure and the opportunity to replace a hegemonic understand-
ing of social change with a new attention to non-state actors.
This chapter has thus stressed specifically the role of non-state actors, able to
participate in processes such as selection of social problems and agenda-building,
decision-making, policy implementation and evaluation. They belong to sectors
such as politics, scientific research, media, and private business. They also impact
the system of knowledge, ideas and beliefs in many issue areas of global gover-
nance thanks to the peculiar features of knowledge democracies. As the fall of a
dominant mainstream has stimulated the rise of smaller, less powerful and yet
influential storylines, it is our conviction that the analysis of governance towards
processes of societal transformations must be enriched by paying greater attention
to those non-state actors.
Specifically, we have worked on the role of epistemic communities, stressing
their increasingly trans-national reach, their ability to influence decision-making as
well as their non-neutrality with regard to topics such as power and geopolitical
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inequalities. This has led us to look at a wider group of actors impacting global
governance, and so with this we moved to the more encompassing notion of
transnational elites. We can now conclude that these variegated groups of actors
actively participate into the current reshaping of global agenda by means of either
knowledge production in many scientific sectors or global culture – the latter
indirectly impacting policy making through its hold on the public’s sensitivities.
In this setting, development is pursued, at least theoretically, through a greater
awareness of cultural diversity, for instance. Human dimensions are always
accounted for, even within development projects funded by promoters of economic
growth. Furthermore, which is our key concern, development has taken a green
colour, and since we have tried to underline how people directly or indirectly
involved in the process of policy making are socialised into similar patterns of
world culture and globalised knowledge, we finally moved to current environmen-
talism. It has here been understood as both a by-product of the increased pluralism
and a further stimulus towards the inclusion and the enhancement of smaller, local
scales within the global picture worked at by transnational elites.
The aim of sustainability is today an agreed one, and demonstrates the potential
for reception of arguments originally articulated by small groups outside formal
governmental structures. The genuine advantage over the old developmentalist
approach mainly carried out by Western developers, lies in the broader intellectual
horizon of the actors involved in the process of knowledge production and policy
making: community centred approaches, basic needs and sustainability represent
now important cornerstones of the mainstream development discourse, at least on a
theoretical ground. Global recognition of environmental issues mirrors the still
weak but increasing empowerment of small communities, sub-national policy
levels, anti-systemic and grassroots movements, as well as scientific vanguards.
From the scientific point of view, greening the development concept appears to be
the right strategy in order to keep the developmentalist machine working on; it also
represents a small paradigm shift whose accomplishment mirrors, among other
things, the increased pluralism at the international level.
At the same time, sustainability is still a controversial goal, as shown by the very
definition of sustainable development proposed by the Brundtland Report and then
agreed upon by most accounts specifically thanks to its open-ended and vagueness
features. In other words, the broad goal of sustainability has been adopted world-
wide, thus stimulating a multilateral policy-making that would have found many
vetoes only a couple of decades ago. Unluckily, this process shows also a negative
side, as sustainability has been absorbed within the same ideational framework as
old developmentalism, so that it is today pursued conjunctly with the goal of
economic growth. The dominant discourse of sustainable development does not
go as far as to question the inequalities among countries and groups, which remains
at the base of the longstanding, unsustainable pattern of production and consump-
tion enjoyed by a small minority of the world population.
This happens because the transformation of radical environmentalist claims into
a mainstream discourse that enabled development to survive the long list of
criticisms it had attracted was mostly realised without a serious review of the
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capitalist mode of societal organisation. Rather, environmentalism had to be made
consistent with the pre-existing worldviews in the economic field. Among the many
constrains current governance towards sustainability encounters, there is thus the
longstanding imperative of economic growth, recognised by many analysts and
practitioners as hardly consistent with an enhanced care for environmental (as well
as social and human) matters.
Moreover, the very fact that environmental issues are addressed at the global
level makes the concrete opportunity for common people to lobby transnational
elites very hard. We are familiar with claims for truly multilevel processes of
decision-making that would finally empower local communities as depositaries of
lay knowledge and practices. However, in spite of the attempts to overcome top-
down and hierarchical approaches to local problems, the framework of guidelines
represented by global governance is mostly set by transnational elites socialised
into a particular system of beliefs involving, among other things, the unquestioned
primacy of the capitalist mode of production and consumption.
The impasse of sustainable development is thus explained, at least in part, by the
fact that the reception of green concerns within the formal agenda has meant
the institutionalisation of a reformist view, in spite of the bottom-up path that the
selection of this social problem had followed from grass-roots movements to the top
of the agenda of the most important global institutions. Today, this fitness between
green claims, on the one hand, and economic liberalism, on the other, stands thus as
both the reason for the success of environmentalism and the constraints which it
encounters.
This is where we stand today. Where do we want to go tomorrow? Currently, we
are still laying the foundations for more sustainable organisations of social life, and
environmental issues are at the top of the international agenda, under the name of
sustainable development. Accordingly, we are left with the hard tasks to eradicate
the imperative of economic growth from sustainability and strengthen the multi-
level dimension of governance, instead of the global one – the final goal being the
full inclusion of, and the acknowledgement of dignity to, social systems far from
assimilating all the western features connected to a capitalist understanding of well-
being.
This is not just utopistics. This is a challenging scientific, political and cultural
programme which requires a consistent effort on scientific, political and cultural
grounds. As we have already experienced the change from a hierarchical and
economicistic understanding of development to a view stressing its human and
environmental dimensions, we should still try hard to further ameliorate the gover-
nance structure in a sustainable way. Taking advantage of the turbulence of our
times, scientists first of all, but also politicians, activists, and media, should not be
afraid of making attempts to revolutionise, in a kuhnian mean, the current
paradigms whenever they suspect it is essential in order to make both the present
and the future world a better one. As the story we have proposed teaches us,
continuing to table even the most drastic of claims – for example, those involving
a change in current path of production and consumption – is the only available
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strategy to see them, sooner or later, finally taken into account by the public as well
as by decision-makers.
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